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ABSTRACT 
 
Investigation of hemispheric asymmetry in reasoning with HD-tDCS and fMRI 
 
by 
 
Nicole Marinsek 
 
Studies on multiple patient groups suggest that reasoning has a hemispheric asymmetry 
component. Previously, we proposed that neural networks in the left hemisphere are driven toward 
increasing and maintaining certainty, while right frontal networks prioritize congruence between 
beliefs and evidence. We tested the predictions of this framework with two high definition 
transcranial direct current stimulation (HD-tDCS) experiments and one functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) experiment. In both HD-tDCS studies, we aimed to induce (or amplify) 
hemispheric asymmetry in healthy participants as they completed novel reasoning tasks. Each 
participant completed three tDCS sessions: a LH-bias session, in which the anode was placed over 
the left inferior frontal gyrus (IFG; BA45) and the cathode over the right IFG; a RH-bias session, in 
which the anode was placed over the right IFG and the cathode over the left IFG; and a sham 
session, which served as a control.  
In the first HD-tDCS experiment, participants (N=26) completed a probabilistic inference task 
that required the integration of evidence and one’s prior background knowledge. Consistent with 
predictions, we found that the intensity of RH-bias stimulation was associated with 1) collecting 
more evidence, 2) adopting a higher threshold for stopping evidence collection, and 3) making less 
certain guesses than an ideal Bayesian updater during the evidence presentation. Contrary to 
  xi 
predictions, we found that greater LH-bias intensity was associated with more evidence collection, 
and LH-bias stimulation was associated with greater belief backtracks after encountering conflicting 
evidence than RH-bias or sham stimulation.  
The second HD-tDCS experiment followed a similar stimulation protocol but used reasoning 
problems that were more deeply embedded in real-world contexts in order to create more salient 
belief-evidence conflicts. During each stimulation session, 24 participants 1) judged whether a 
criminal suspect was guilty or not guilty based on crime scene evidence, 2) judged whether or not 
to pass a law based on arguments in favor and in opposition to it, and 3) judged whether a news 
headline was real or fake. We found that RH-bias stimulation reduced belief polarization after 
conflict, which was consistent with our predictions. Similarly, when evidence conflicted participants’ 
strong beliefs, they backtracked on their beliefs more under RH-bias stimulation compared to sham 
stimulation and, albeit to a lesser extent, compared to LH-bias stimulation. Under RH-bias 
stimulation, participants were less likely to judge real news headlines as being real, which resulted 
in poorer discrimination of real vs. fake headlines compared to sham and LH-bias stimulation.  
Finally, in the fMRI experiment, we examined lateralization in frontal anatomical regions for 
contrasts that we predicted to be more left-lateralized or more right-lateralized. Participants (N=36) 
completed a modified version of the state guessing task that was used in the first tDCS experiment. 
Consistent with predictions, contrasts involving uncertainty and belief advances were generally 
more left-lateralized and contrasts involving conflicting evidence and belief backtracks were more 
right-lateralized.  
We show that HD-tDCS can alter belief updating in healthy individuals in a way that is 
consistent with the patient literature, but additional experiments are necessary to disentangle the 
causal relationships between different reasoning biases and neural activity in left and right 
frontal neural networks.
  xii 
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I. Introduction 
A rich history of patient studies reveal that different reasoning deficits arise when the left vs. the 
right frontal cortices are damaged or disconnected and suggest that human reasoning may have a 
hemispheric lateralization component. However, there is less convincing evidence of hemispheric 
asymmetry from studies on healthy individuals, principally because very few reasoning studies 
directly examine laterality. In this section, we review the evidence for hemispheric asymmetry in 
reasoning from studies on split-brain patients, patients with unilateral brain damage, and patients 
with delusional disorders, and the relatively weaker evidence from studies on healthy individuals. 
We synthesize these bodies of literatures into a simple framework and propose two 
neurostimulation experiments and one neuroimaging experiment that test the predictions of this 
framework in healthy individuals.   
A. Evidence of hemispheric asymmetry in reasoning 
1. Reasoning in the split-brain 
Patients with severe epilepsy occasionally have their corpus callosum cut to isolate seizure 
activity to one hemisphere. This procedure reduces the frequency and severity of the seizures, but it 
leaves a patient with two divided, independent hemispheres – a split brain. Split-brain patients offer 
a unique opportunity to study the two hemispheres in isolation; by presenting stimuli to one half of 
the visual field, the mental capabilities of each hemisphere can be characterized independently of 
the other. 
Using this method, Gazzaniga and colleagues discovered that the left hemisphere has a 
propensity to make inferences and create explanations. He named this tendency of the left 
hemisphere to create explanations the Left Brain Interpreter (Gazzaniga, 2000). In one experiment, a 
split-brain patient’s left hemisphere was shown a picture of a chicken claw and his right hemisphere 
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was shown a picture of a snow scene. The patient was asked to point to a card that was associated 
with the picture he just saw. With his left hand (controlled by his right hemisphere) he selected a 
shovel, which matched the snow scene, and with his right hand (controlled by his left hemisphere) 
he selected a chicken, which matched the chicken claw. The experimenter asked the patient why he 
selected each item. One would expect the speaking left hemisphere to explain why it chose the 
chicken but not why it chose the shovel, since the left hemisphere did not have access to that 
information. Instead, the patient’s speaking left hemisphere replied, “Oh, that’s simple. The chicken 
claw goes with the chicken and you need a shovel to clean out the chicken shed” (Gazzaniga, 2000). 
The left hemisphere quickly created an explanation for the behavior – an explanation that was 
incorrect but nonetheless plausible, given the left hemisphere’s limited information. In another 
experiment, researchers presented the command to stand to the right hemisphere. After the patient 
stood, experimenters asked the patient why he did so. Again, instead of admitting that he did not 
know why he stood, the speaking left hemisphere created an explanation, insisting he was thirsty 
and wanted a drink (see Gazzaniga & Miller, 2009). 
Although these anecdotes illustrate the interpretative abilities of the left hemisphere, they do 
not necessarily suggest that inference making is left lateralized; indeed, the right hemisphere may 
also readily create causal explanations, but these explanations go undetected because they are not 
verbalized. To directly test the inferential capabilities of each hemisphere, Gazzaniga and Smylie 
(1984) presented two pictures to one hemisphere of split-brain patients and asked the patients to 
point to a picture that depicted the outcome of combining the objects with their contralateral hand. 
For example, in one trial a patient’s left hemisphere was shown pictures of a match and wooden 
log, and the patient could choose between pictures of a woodpile, a lit cigarette, or a bonfire (the 
correct causal outcome) with their right hand. This task required patients to infer the causal 
relationship between two objects. Even though both hemispheres possessed a sophisticated 
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lexicon, only the left hemisphere could infer the causal relationship between the two items, and this 
trend held for both verbal and visual stimuli. Consistent with these results, Roser et al. (2005) 
showed that the left hemisphere can use evidence to extract an underlying causal structure, but the 
right hemisphere performs at chance. There’s also evidence that the left hemisphere, but not the 
right hemisphere, may attempt to infer and predict an underlying causal structure even when told 
that events are random (Wolford, Miller, & Gazzaniga, 2000).  
The left hemisphere’s tendency to make inferences is also apparent in the realm of memory. In 
one experiment, Phelps and Gazzaniga (1992) presented visual scenes with a common theme to 
split-brain patients and later tested each hemisphere’s memory for the scenes. During the 
recognition test, the left hemisphere falsely remembered scenes that were not present in the study 
phase, but that fit the gist of the presented scenes. The right hemisphere, on the other hand, 
demonstrated a veridical memory for the scenes. Again, the results suggest that the left hemisphere 
created inferences and bridged semantic gaps, which led to the false recognition of items that fit a 
schema or gist.  
Research on split-brain subjects clearly establishes the left hemisphere’s role in inference 
making, but only moderately addresses the evaluative capabilities of the right hemisphere. 
However, there is some evidence from split-brain studies that suggests the right hemisphere is 
necessary for evaluating and updating interpretations. Miller et al. (2010) presented moral 
reasoning problems to split-brain patients. The moral reasoning problems consisted of scenarios 
that featured characters with either cruel or helpful intentions and outcomes that were either 
harmful or neutral. Their results are consistent with the idea that the split-brain patients’ left 
hemispheres formed quick-and-dirty inferences when presented with initial evidence about the 
scenario (the potential danger of the situation), and these inferences were resistant to revision when 
additional evidence about the characters’ intentions was provided. This suggests that, without the 
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right hemisphere’s ability to reject inappropriate or improbable hypotheses when contradictory 
evidence arises, the left hemisphere maintains its original explanations, even if they are no longer 
relevant.  
A consistent story emerges from split-brain studies: the left hemisphere is specialized for 
making inferences, creating explanations, interpreting ambiguity, and bridging information gaps. As 
Gazzaniga writes, “Ah, lack of knowledge is of no importance, the left brain will find a solution! 
Order must be made. The first makes-sense explanation will do.” (Gazzniga, 2008). It does not 
seem to be the case that the right hemisphere has the same inferential abilities as the left 
hemisphere, but they simply go undetected in split-brain patients. In carefully controlled 
experiments that probe the inferential abilities of each hemisphere irrespective of language 
abilities, the left hemisphere makes more inferences than the right hemisphere. This may improve 
performance in some cases, such as when inferring causality, but hinder performance in other cases, 
such as when remembering whether an item was encountered before or when predicting random 
events.  
2. Reasoning in the damaged brain 
Research on patients with unilateral brain damage also indicates that the left hemisphere 
creates explanatory inferences and the right hemisphere monitors the plausibility of those 
inferences in relation to other evidence. A study by Deglin and Kinsbourne (1996) offers a striking 
example of these divergent hemispheric specialties. In their experiment, patients undergoing 
electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) were shown two premises with familiar or unfamiliar content and 
were asked if a given conclusion supported or contradicted the premises. For example, patients 
were given the premises “Every state has a flag. Zambia is a state” and were asked “Does Zambia 
have a flag, or not?” Each patient completed the task on three separate occasions: once after ECT 
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was used to suppress activity in the left hemisphere, once after ECT was used to suppress activity in 
the right hemisphere, and once before receiving ECT (which served as a control condition). 
Incredibly, even though the same syllogisms were presented to the same patients, the patients’ 
responses differed wildly depending on which hemisphere was suppressed. When patients’ right 
hemispheres were suppressed (and their left hemispheres were spared), their responses were 
consistent with the logic of the syllogism -- even when the logic conflicted the patients’ beliefs and 
when the material was unfamiliar – and the patients responded faster and with more confidence, as 
compared to the control condition. In contrast, when the left hemisphere was suppressed (and the 
right hemisphere was spared) the patients tended to give responses that were consistent with real-
world prior knowledge. Furthermore, if the premises contradicted real-world knowledge or were 
unfamiliar, the patients questioned the premises, answered with uncertainty, or refused to answer at 
all. For example, when presented with the Zambia syllogism, the same subject responded, “Each 
state has a flag, Zambia has also” under right hemisphere suppression but “Who knows it, this 
Zambia, how can I know whether it has a flag or not?” under left hemisphere suppression. This 
research demonstrates the different cognitive tendencies of the hemispheres: the left hemisphere 
readily makes inferences, regardless of content or conflicting evidence, and the right hemisphere 
ensures that conclusions are consistent with reality.  
Studies on brain-damaged patients are consistent with these results. Patients with an intact left 
hemisphere, but damaged right hemisphere, retain the ability to make simple inferences about 
hypothetical situations (Caplan and Dapretto, 2001; Ferstl, Guthke, & von Cramon, 2002; Goel et 
al., 2006; Reverberi, Shallice, D’Agostini, Skrap, & Bonatti, 2009). Indeed, right hemisphere brain 
damage is often associated with excessive inference making – patients draw conclusions with 
incomplete information and infer relationships where there are none (Goel et al., 2006). Patients 
with unilateral damage to the left hemisphere, on the other hand, have trouble making inferences 
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(Reverberi et al., 2009). Together, these results demonstrate that causal inference making is 
lateralized to the left hemisphere to some extent.  
Research on unilateral brain damaged patients also suggests that the right hemisphere is 
specialized for 1) detecting inconsistencies between hypotheses and reality and 2) overturning 
inappropriate hypotheses. Patients with an intact right hemisphere, but damaged left hemisphere, 
are sensitive to conflict and can easily identify semantic inconsistencies (Ferstl et al., 2002). When 
the right hemisphere is damaged, however, patients fail to detect contradictions and their 
hypotheses become rigid and impermeable to conflicting evidence. In one experiment, Brownell 
Potter, Bihrle, & Gardner (1986) showed patients with unilateral right hemisphere damage two 
sentences that could be integrated to form one interpretation. Importantly, one of the sentences 
supported a different, incorrect interpretation when presented by itself. Brownell manipulated the 
position of the misleading sentence to test the patients’ ability to revise an initial incorrect 
hypothesis. Compared to controls, patients with right hemisphere brain damage made fewer 
correct inferences. They could accurately extract true causal relationships but tended to make 
inappropriate associations between non-related items. Patients’ erroneous inferences were 
especially prevalent when the misleading information was presented first. These findings suggest 
that an isolated left hemisphere readily creates explanations, but fails to revise them in accordance 
with new evidence. A functioning right hemisphere is needed to detect inconsistencies and update 
flawed hypotheses accordingly.  
In another study (Danckert, Stottinger, Quehl, & Anderson, 2011), patients with left brain 
damage, right brain damage, or no brain damage played a game of rock, paper, scissors against a 
computer. The virtual opponent initially started off with equal choices of rock, paper, and scissors, 
but eventually changed its responding to heavily favor one of the options. Patients with left brain 
damage and control participants detected the changes in the virtual opponent’s gameplay and 
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updated their strategy accordingly to win more games. Patients with right hemisphere brain 
damage, however, failed to update their strategy. Again, this suggests that the right hemisphere is 
necessary to update hypotheses and behaviors to be consistent with new evidence.  
In a similar vein, right hemisphere brain damage and hypometabolism have been linked to 
greater perseveration in the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (Lombardi et al., 1999). Patients can 
discover the correct rule but, without a functioning right hemisphere, their beliefs become fixed and 
immune to subsequent negative feedback. However, it should be noted that other studies that 
examine performance on the WCST find perseveration in patient groups with both right and left 
hemisphere damage (Stuss et al., 2000).  
The importance of the right hemisphere in shifting from one mental set to another is also 
apparent in real-world tasks. Goel et al. (2013) asked patients with unilateral brain lesions to plan a 
trip to Italy and found that patients with right hemisphere brain damage made inferior plans 
compared with other patients and controls. Goel et al. attribute the patients’ poor planning to 
substandard mental set shifting: “Damage to the right PFC system impairs the encoding and 
processing of more abstract and vague representations that facilitate lateral transformations. This 
results in prematurely locking onto precise concrete patterns, and quickly drawing conclusions, 
albeit substandard ones” (Goel et al., 2013 pg. 721). Without a functioning right prefrontal cortex, 
patients latched on to potential solutions too quickly and prematurely stopped looking for, 
considering, and elaborating on alternative solutions. 
Together, these studies suggest that the left hemisphere is specialized for creating inferences 
and the right hemisphere is specialized for monitoring these inferences and overturning them if 
necessary. In line with this framework, left hemisphere brain damage leads to impaired inference 
making and a greater reliance on prior knowledge, but conflict detection is spared. In contrast, right 
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hemisphere brain damage does not impair inference making, but patients’ inferences can become 
inappropriately excessive and resistant to contradictory evidence.  
3. Reasoning in the deluded brain 
Much like how perceptual researchers investigate the normal functioning of the visual system by 
using optical illusions to study its failures, we can gain insights about normal hypothesis-making by 
studying cases of abnormal reasoning, such as delusions. Delusions are defined as “fixed beliefs 
that are not amenable to change in light of conflicting evidence” (American Psychiatric Association, 
2013). They are characterized by excessive inference making (Braun & Suffren, 2011), the tendency 
to prematurely jump to conclusions (Conway et al., 2002; Dudley, John, Young, & Over, 1997; Huq, 
Garety, Hemsley, & Park, 1988; Moritz & Woodward, 2005; Warman, Lysaker, Martin, Davis, & 
Haudenschield, 2007), impaired belief updating (Coltheart, Langdon, & McKay, 2011; Coltheart, 
Menzies, & Sutton, 2010; Coltheart, 2010; Marcel, Tegnér, & Nimmo-Smith, 2004), and the 
discounting of evidence that disconfirms their beliefs (Woodward, Moritz, Cuttler, & Whitman, 2006; 
Speechley, Ngan, Moritz, & Woodward, 2010, Eisenacher & Zink, 2017). Based on our predictions 
that the left hemisphere supports explanatory inference making and the right hemisphere supports 
belief monitoring and revision, it follows that delusions should be associated with left hemisphere 
hyperactivity and right hemisphere hypoactivity or damage.  
Consistent with this prediction, delusional disorders are strongly linked to damage to the right 
hemisphere. Braun and Suffren (2011) conducted a meta-analysis of unilateral brain lesions that 
resulted in delusional disorder and found that 80% of the lesions were right lateralized. Right-
lateralized lesions were associated with other delusional symptoms, including somatoparaphrenia 
(the pathological denial of limb ownership), reduplicative paramnesia (the belief that a place has 
been duplicated), and flight of ideas. A more recent review of 61 patients with delusional 
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misidentification syndrome, found that 92% of the patients had right hemisphere damage and 63% 
of patients had damage to the right frontal lobe in particular (Darby & Prasad, 2016). Similarly, 
Devinsky (2009) reviewed the etiology of delusions and found that several different types of 
delusions are associated with unilateral right hemisphere or bilateral brain damage, but rarely 
unilateral left hemisphere damage. Without the constraint of an evaluative right hemisphere, the left 
hemisphere liberally creates inferences and explanations that are resistant to contradictory evidence 
and may develop into pathological delusional beliefs. Indeed, as Devinsky writes, “Delusions result 
from right hemisphere lesions. But it is the left hemisphere that is deluded” (pg. 85). In another 
review of the role of the right hemisphere in delusions, Gurin and Blum (2017) conclude, the “right 
hemisphere is essential for our ability to create and maintain accurate appraisals of mental objects 
holistically and in context.”  
Corlett et al. (2007) provide additional evidence that delusions arise from a dysfunctional right-
lateralized evaluative system. In their study, they taught delusional patients and controls associative 
mappings between foods and allergic outcomes. After the participants learned the mappings 
thoroughly, the researchers gave participants negative feedback that contradicted the mappings 
they were taught. In healthy controls, the right ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (vlPFC) demonstrated 
a reward-prediction error: relative to baseline, its activity increased in response to unexpected 
feedback and decreased in response to expected feedback. The right vlPFC of delusional patients, 
however, failed to distinguish between expected and unexpected feedback, suggesting the 
delusional patients’ prediction-error processing was impaired. These results suggest that delusional 
patients’ right hemispheres fail to detect discrepancies between evidence and beliefs, and this 
impairment may be present without apparent brain damage. 
Coltheart also argues that damage to the right lateral prefrontal cortex underlies the formation 
of delusional beliefs (Coltheart, 2010). In his two-factor account of delusions, he proposes that 
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delusions require 1) an impairment that elicits some sort of explanation and 2) a dysfunctional belief 
evaluation system that fails to reject implausible explanations for the initial impairment (Coltheart et 
al., 2011, 2010; Coltheart, 2010; McKay, Langdon, & Coltheart, 2007). According to Coltheart, the 
initial impairment determines the content of the delusion and varies from case to case. However, he 
suggests an impaired belief system is universal among delusional patients and results from damage 
to the right lateral prefrontal cortex. Coltheart et al. (2010) reviewed cases of patients with 
neurological symptoms that mirror those of delusional patients, but who nonetheless fail to develop 
delusional beliefs. They proposed that these patients, unlike delusional patients, have an intact right 
frontal lobe, which allows them to reject implausible hypotheses and update their beliefs in 
accordance with reality. In a particularly striking example in support of this view, Bisiach et al. (1991) 
temporarily increased activity in the right hemisphere of a patient who believed her left arm 
belonged to her mother by irrigating her left ear with cold water. Incredibly, the irrigation abolished 
the patient’s delusion: up to 2 h after the procedure, she rightfully claimed her arm as her own. This 
finding has since been replicated (Ramachandran, 1996) and supports the necessity of the right 
hemisphere in updating inappropriate beliefs.  
Anosognosia, the pathological denial of impairment or disease, is another example of a 
delusion that is rooted in right hemisphere brain damage (Ramachandran, 1996; Stone, Halligan, & 
Greenwood, 1993). Marcel, Tegner, and Nimmo-Smith (2004) examined the beliefs of 64 patients 
with anosognosia for hemiplegia (denial of paralysis). Of the 64 patients, 44 had unilateral damage 
to the right hemisphere and 22 had unilateral damage to the left hemisphere. They found that 
patients with right hemisphere lesions, but not so much those with left hemisphere lesions, 
consistently overestimated their abilities to perform tasks requiring the use of their paralyzed limbs. 
Moreover, only patients with right hemisphere brain damage continued to overestimate their ability 
to perform a task after they had just failed to perform the task in question. These results illustrate 
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that right hemisphere brain damage cannot only lead to the formation of delusional beliefs, but it 
can also lead to the persistence of these delusions since inappropriate beliefs are not updated in 
light of contradictory evidence.  
In addition to right hemisphere hypoactivity or damage, delusions may also arise from left 
hemisphere hyperactivity. Braun and Suffren (2011) review several instances in which delusions arise 
from left hemisphere hyper-metabolism in the absence of right hemisphere damage. They also note 
that antipsychotic drugs may reduce delusional ideation by suppressing activity in the left 
hemisphere and facilitating activity in the right hemisphere. In a similar vein, Mucci et al. (2005) 
found a relationship between paranoid beliefs in healthy subjects and greater left-lateralized brain 
activity. 
Our framework predicts that normal reasoning goes awry when the balance between left 
hemisphere inference making and right hemisphere evaluation and revision is disrupted. Delusions 
are examples of such a disruption. Delusions are characterized by liberal hypothesis formation and 
impaired hypothesis evaluation and, as would be predicted, are tied to left hemisphere over-activity 
or right hemisphere under-activity.  
4. Reasoning in the healthy brain 
The closest correlates to patient studies in non-patient populations are neurostimulation 
studies. Neurostimulation techniques temporarily alter brain activity and allow researchers to 
examine corresponding changes in behavior. There have been relatively few neurostimulation 
studies on reasoning, but several of the studies that have been carried are consistent with the 
patient literature. Sharot et al. (2012) investigated how inhibition of the left inferior frontal gyrus 
(IFG) or right IFG with transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) influenced how participants 
incorporated bad news and good news into their beliefs. Individuals generally incorporate good 
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news into their beliefs to a greater extent that bad news (for example, learning that a disease is less 
common than originally thought will make participants lower their predictions of the prevalence of 
the disease to a larger than extent than they would raise their prevalence predictions after learning 
that a disease is more common than originally thought). They found that inhibition of the left IFG, 
but not inhibition of the right IFG, reduced the good news / bad news effect, meaning that 
participants were more likely to incorporate negative evidence into their beliefs when the left IFG 
was inhibited and the right IFG was spared. Lupyan, Mirman, Hamilton, and Thompson-Schill (2012) 
applied either cathodal tDCS or anodal tDCS to participants’ left IFG as they categorized items 
along different dimensions that ranged from more concrete (for example, color) to more abstract 
(for example, objects that hold water). They found that participants lowered their thresholds for 
selecting objects that were more weakly associated with the target category under anodal left IFG 
stimulation, but not under cathodal stimulation. This finding reinforces the idea that the left 
hemisphere is driven toward making conceptual associations and inferences. Coltheart et al. (2018) 
found that inhibiting the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) with TMS made healthy 
participants more susceptible to hypnosis (that is, more susceptible to having “magnetic hands,” 
“levitating arms,” “rigid arms,” and “sour tastes”), suggesting that the right frontal lobe helps 
prevent the formation of implausible beliefs and delusions. Finally, several neurostimulation studies 
have found that the right IFG plays a role in behavioral inhibition (Cunillera, Fuentemilla, Briganani, 
Cucurell, & Miniussi, 2014; Ditye, Jacobson, Walsh, & Lavidor, 2012; Drummond, Cressman, & 
Carlsen, 2017; Hogeveen et al., 2016; Jacobson, Javitt, & Lavidor, 2011; Stramaccia et al., 2015).  
Using behavioral and neuroimaging methods to study hemispheric lateralization in healthy 
brains poses several challenges. First, unlike research on brain-damaged and split-brain patients, 
research on healthy individuals cannot rely on participants’ behavior to elucidate brain function. In 
patient studies, patients’ reasoning errors can be analyzed in conjunction with their pathology to 
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determine the function of different brain regions. However, healthy participants’ behavior and 
reasoning errors cannot be localized to one hemisphere or the other, since both hemispheres can 
contribute to behavior and cognition in an intact brain. Neuroimaging techniques are needed to 
identify the brain regions that are recruited during reasoning. However, these techniques may still 
fail to shed light on hemispheric lateralization.  Healthy participants naturally form, evaluate, and 
revise hypotheses concurrently, which complicates the identification of brain networks that support 
each individual sub-process, if they exist. In order to identify the brain areas that support inference 
making or belief updating, researchers must use tasks that differentially load on either process. 
Even then, contrasts designed to find the neural correlates of one process may be contaminated by 
the neural fingerprints of other processes, which may in turn make a truly lateralized process appear 
bilateral. Despite these challenges, there is some evidence of a lateralized hypothesis-making 
network in healthy individuals. 
Neuroimaging studies with tasks that feature interpretation and inference making elicit largely 
left-lateralized brain activity. In one experiment, Parris et al. (2009) recorded subjects’ brain activity 
with fMRI as they watched videos of magic tricks or control videos, which had the same beginning 
as the magic trick videos but ended with either an expected or unrelated surprising event. They 
found that only the left dorsolateral PFC was more active when subjects viewed magic tricks than 
when they viewed expected or unrelated surprising events. As the researchers concluded, this 
increased activity may reflect the left hemisphere’s attempt to explain the magic trick. Left-
lateralized brain networks have been identified for tasks involving interpreting and reasoning about 
past events (D’Argembeau et al., 2013), making inferences about related sentences (Ferstl & von 
Cramon, 2002; Friese, Rutschmann, Raabe, & Schmalhofer, 2008), and inferring a rule or 
relationship (Rodriguez-Moreno & Hirsch, 2009).  
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Tasks involving evaluation and belief updating, on the other hand, implicate the right 
hemisphere. Neuroimaging studies using healthy subjects consistently find that the right lateral PFC 
is recruited when logic conflicts with prior beliefs (Goel, Buchel, Frith & Dolan, 2000; Goel & Dolan, 
2003; Goel, 2007; Menenti et al., 2009; Stollstorff, Vartanian, & Goel, 2012) and its activity is 
modulated by the degree to which reasoning problems conflict with real-world knowledge 
(Stollstorff et al., 2012). Regions in the right hemisphere are also active when subjects receive 
negative feedback indicating that their hypothesis is no longer correct (Konishi et al., 2002).  
The right hemisphere has been shown to support mental set shifts. Cools, Clark, Owen, and 
Robbins (2002) showed that the right vlPFC is active during the last trial before a hypothesis switch 
in the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST) and this activity is independent of the receipt of 
negative feedback. In the realm of hypothesis making, the right vlPFC may reject a previously held 
belief or hypothesis and initiate a search for a new one, thus shifting the mental set from one 
hypothesis to another.  Vartanian and Goel (2005) also highlight the role of the right vlPFC in set-
shifting. They gave participants problems that required the participants to undergo lateral 
transformations – mental movements “from one state in a problem space to a horizontally displaced 
state rather than a more detailed version of the same state” – to correctly solve the problems 
(Vartanian & Goel, 2005, pg. 1170). Based on the neuroimaging results and previous research, they 
concluded the right vlPFC initiates lateral transformations. The right vlPFC’s involvement in set-
shifting and the detection of belief-logic conflicts strengthens the view that it supports belief 
evaluation and revision. In healthy indiviudals, the right vlPFC may monitor the consistency and 
plausibility of hypotheses and initiate the revision or search for a new hypothesis if new, 
contradictory evidence arises. 
Outside the domains of reasoning and hypothesis making, the right hemisphere has been 
shown to play a general role in monitoring and inhibiting thoughts and behavior. Chatham et al. 
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(2012) and Stuss and Alexander (2007) review evidence that suggests that the right hemisphere, 
and specifically the right vlPFC, plays a role in context monitoring. Aron, Robbins, and Poldrack 
(2014) propose that the right vlPFC serves as a brake to inhibit task-irrelevant behavior. Together, 
these general findings suggest that the right hemisphere monitors the environment for 
inconsistencies or goal-irrelevant stimuli and inhibits behaviors or thoughts that interfere with the 
goal at hand.  
Although several neuroimaging studies provide evidence for hemispheric asymmetry in 
reasoning, others report bilateral activations for contrasts that we would predict to have a 
lateralization component, such as contrasts for inference making (Fangmeier, Knauff, Ruff, & 
Sloutsky, 2006; Kalbfleisch, Van Meter, & Zeffiro, 2007; Landmann et al., 2006; Lie, Specht, 
Marshall, & Fink, 2006; Simard et al., 2011) or hypothesis evaluation (Fangmeier et al., 2006; 
Kroger, Nystrom, Cohen, & Johnson-Laird, 2008; Rodriguez-Moreno & Hirsch, 2009). As discussed 
earlier, it is possible that these contrasts did not find lateralized processing because the contrasts 
did not adequately isolate the reasoning process of interest. Indeed, none of the neuroimaging 
contrasts reported in any of these neuroimaging experiments were specifically designed to test 
hypotheses about lateralization. In order to gain a greater understanding of the hemispheric 
asymmetry in reasoning in the neuroimaging literature, we previously ran a meta-analysis of all fMRI 
studies that involved hypothesis formation or hypothesis evaluation and computed lateralization 
scores in different brain regions. 
Meta-analysis of fMRI studies investigating the neural basis of reasoning: We collected relevant 
neuroimaging articles by running a series of PubMed searches on 17 terms related to reasoning 
(e.g., “syllogistic reasoning”, “Raven’s Progressive Matrices”, etc.) and excluded studies that 
included only patients, used a methodology other than fMRI, or were not published in peer-
reviewed journals, resulting in 125 papers (Turner, Marinsek, Ryhal, & Miller, 2015). Two readers 
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independently labeled every contrast in each paper based on the task used and the fMRI analyses 
implemented. We conducted a meta-analysis of several labels using the Activation Likelihood 
Estimation approach (Eickhoff, Bzdok, Laird, Kurth, & Fox, 2012) and GingerALE (Eickhoff et al., 
2009). The selected labels were chosen to load primarily on hypothesis formation (including 
“building a model” and “rule finding”), hypothesis evaluation (including “statement verification” 
and “rule checking”), or conflict. We predicted that the hypothesis formation contrasts would be 
more left-lateralized and the hypothesis evaluation and conflict contrasts would be more right-
lateralized.  
The maps shown in Figure 1 present the results of the five separate ALE analyses. In line with 
the patient literature, conflict is strongly, although not exclusively, right-lateralized and hypothesis 
formation (consisting of the “building a model” and “rule finding” labels) is predominantly, but 
again not entirely, left-lateralized. Hypothesis evaluation (consisting of the “statement verification” 
and “rule checking” labels) shows essentially the same pattern of left-hemisphere dominance as 
hypothesis formation, which is inconsistent with both the patient literature and our predictions.  
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Figure 1: Results of our meta-analyses. The "building a model" and "rule finding" contrasts 
were predicted to be more left-lateralized and the "statement verification," "rule checking," 
and "conflict” contrasts were predicted to be more right-lateralized. Translucent clusters 
correspond to type II error–matched thresholding; solid clusters correspond to type I error–
matched thresholding.  
 There are a number of potential explanations for these ambiguous results. First, it is 
possible that reasoning has no lateralization components and the laterality observed in patient 
groups does not represent the true state of the brain. It is also possible that the right hemisphere is 
specialized for detecting and rejecting salient conflicts between hypotheses and reality, but the 
hemispheres contribute equally to making simple verifications and evaluations (or these evaluations 
are done in a content-specific manner). Since many of the contrasts that contributed to the 
“statement verification” and “rule checking” labels were simple and abstract, these labels may not 
have been a good test of our hypothesis. Alternatively, it is possible that previous neuroimaging 
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studies fail to capture true lateralization in reasoning. Most of the studies included in our meta-
analysis were not designed to separate out the processes of interest and many included 
confounded processes, in particular those related to language processing or spatial reasoning. It is 
also possible that fMRI is fundamentally ill-suited to address questions of laterality; for example, 
different neural architectures may produce different outputs, thus leading to different behaviors, but 
have similar BOLD activity profiles. These difficulties, even under the “best case” where power 
issues are minimized, indicate the need for a different approach. This proposal describes three 
experiments that use a combination of neuroimaging and neurostimulation methods to causally test 
the hypothesis that the hemispheres have different reasoning biases. 
B. Proposed framework of hemispheric asymmetry in reasoning 
Based on the evidence presented above, we propose that the left and right hemispheres play 
different, yet complementary, roles in inferential reasoning. Evidence suggests that the left 
hemisphere tends to create inferences and explanations to reduce uncertainty. As Gazzaniga 
suggested nearly three decades ago, the left hemisphere is an interpreter (Gazzaniga, 1989). Its 
propensity to explain resembles abductive inference, or inference to the best explanation (Coltheart 
et al., 2010); its inferences do not necessarily have to be correct, or even plausible in some cases, as 
long as they bridge gaps in information and create a cohesive story. When free from the reign of 
the moderating influence of the right hemisphere, the left hemisphere’s inferences may become 
excessive or inappropriate, and become resistant to contradictory evidence. However, this is not to 
say that the left hemisphere always makes poor explanations. Indeed, it seems as if the quality of 
the left hemisphere’s inferences is commensurate to the quality of the evidence it reasons with; 
most of the time, the left hemisphere’s inferences are sound and effectively reduce the uncertainty 
of the environment. If evidence is sparse or unusual however, the left hemisphere may create 
explanations that are incorrect, implausible, or even bizarre.   
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Unlike the left hemisphere, the right hemisphere, in our view, places a premium on cohesion. It 
is sensitive to conflicts between hypotheses and real-world knowledge or evidence. In line with its 
roles in belief updating and set-shifting, we propose that the right hemisphere 1) monitors the 
plausibility of hypotheses and 2) jettisons explanations that are inconsistent with reality or new 
evidence. Thus, the right hemisphere may prompt the revision of inappropriate hypotheses and 
initiate the search for new ones. In the realm of hypothesis making, if the left hemisphere is 
considered an interpreter, the right hemisphere may be considered a realist. While the left 
hemisphere strives to reduce uncertainty, the right hemisphere strives to reduce inconsistencies 
between hypotheses and reality. 
Our conceptualizations of the left hemisphere as an interpreter and the right hemisphere as a 
realist are akin to Ramachandran’s distinction between left and right hemispheric tendencies 
(Ramachandran, 1996). According to Ramachandran, “The left hemisphere's job is to create a 
model and maintain it at all costs... The right hemisphere's strategy, on the other hand, is 
fundamentally different. I like to call it the 'anomaly detector', for when the anomalous information 
reaches a certain threshold, the right hemisphere decides that it is time to force the left hemisphere 
to revise the entire model and start from scratch” (pg. 351-352). Once the left hemisphere adopts a 
model that minimizes uncertainty and maximizes explanatory power, it incorporates new evidence 
into the model and may rationalize, ignore, or deny any contradictory evidence. This “band-aid 
approach” creates a patchwork of explanations and rationalizations, but effectively reduces 
uncertainty by doing so. Unlike the left hemisphere, the neural processes clustered in the right 
hemisphere are sensitive to contradictions between beliefs and evidence. When contradictory 
evidence arises, the right hemisphere may prompt the reworking of the model to satisfy the new 
evidence or may suppress attempts at explanation altogether – in its view, it is better to be 
uncertain than wrong.  
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It’s important to note that, although we discuss each hemisphere as a whole, we ascribe 
different reasoning biases to different local neural networks in each hemisphere. We suggest that 
differences in neural architecture or functional connectivity can give rise to different processing 
characteristics and strategies, but these differences likely do not extend to all networks in each 
hemisphere. When we refer to each hemisphere, rather than the neural networks that comprise it, it 
is only for the sake of brevity.  
1. Congruence with other theories 
Our framework is compatible with broader, more general theories of hemispheric lateralization. 
Bowden, Jung-Beeman, Fleck, and Kounios (2005) propose that the hemispheres differ in the 
granularity of their computations and these differences produce distinct cognitive strategies and 
capabilities. Specifically, they suggest that computations in the right hemisphere are more coarsely 
tuned than those of the left hemisphere, an idea supported by the finding that the right hemisphere 
is more interconnected—both on a cellular and systems level—than the left hemisphere (Bowden et 
al., 2005). The relative coarse coding of the right hemisphere and relative fine coding of the left 
hemisphere would make the hemispheres predisposed to global and local processing, respectively. 
In the realm of inferential reasoning, the coarse, global processing of the right hemisphere may 
facilitate the detection of discrepancies between an explanation and its global, real-world context. 
Conversely, the finer coding of the left hemisphere may emphasize local cohesion at the expense of 
global consistency.  
Braun’s “psychic tonus” model of hemispheric specialization is also consistent with our claim 
that the left hemisphere tends to create inferences while the right hemisphere tends to monitor, 
evaluate, and revise them (Braun, 2007). According to his model, the left hemisphere generally 
activates mentation and behavior while the right hemisphere inhibits it. More colloquially, the left 
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hemisphere is predisposed to “do something” and the right hemisphere is inclined to “freeze and 
recoup” (Braun, 2007, pg. 418). The propensity of the left hemisphere to act and create is 
consistent with our view that it plays a prominent role in making inferences and bridging gaps in 
information. Likewise, the right hemisphere’s tendency to inhibit behavior is in line with our 
proposal that it plays a role in monitoring and inhibiting inappropriate hypotheses.  
In his review, Braun also suggests that the hemispheres act in opposition to each other: the 
suppression of cognitive modules in one hemisphere activates their counterparts in the other 
hemisphere and vice versa. Craig (2005) echoes the idea of hemispheric opposition in his review of 
emotional asymmetry and suggests that the balance between opposing hemispheric systems 
facilitates homeostasis and health. It is possible that hemispheric opposition also plays a role in 
inferential reasoning; the two hemispheric reasoning systems may compete during inference 
making and may be preferentially recruited in accordance with situational demands. A dual 
reasoning system with opponent interactions could promote balanced and flexible inference 
making. Moreover, disruption in the balance between the two component systems may explain 
aberrant reasoning in brain-damaged and delusional patients. In the case of right hemisphere brain 
damage, an overactive left–lateralized reasoning system may lead to excessive inference making. 
Conversely, a right-lateralized reasoning system resulting from left hemisphere brain damage may 
lead to insufficient inference making, as patient studies suggest.  
In his theory of hemispheric lateralization, Corballis (1989) proposes that the left hemisphere is 
uniquely generative; that is, it combines visual, lexical, or semantic elements to create “novel 
assemblages” (pg. 499). Corballis argues that the left hemisphere’s capacity for language and visual 
image production is rooted in its ability to create novel combinations. In the realm of reasoning, the 
generativity of the left hemisphere could facilitate, or perhaps even underlie, inference making, 
since both processes involve making new associations to create a cohesive whole. Unlike the left 
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hemisphere, Corballis suggests that the right hemisphere uses an analogue code of representation; 
that is, its neural representations reflect reality and leave less room for interpretation and 
manipulation. Again, the right hemisphere’s tendency to represent items veridically is consistent 
with our view that the right hemisphere prioritizes truth and consistency during reasoning.  
In their review of the functional anatomy of inferential reasoning, Barbey & Patterson (2011) 
presented evidence that the ventrolateral PFC supports explanation generation, the dorsolateral 
PFC supports explanation evaluation, and the anterior PFC supports the integration of inferences. 
Although they did not emphasize hemispheric specialization in the review, their meta-analysis 
revealed a distinct hemispheric lateralization, such that the left hemisphere supports hypothesis 
formation and integration and the right hemisphere supports hypothesis evaluation. These findings 
are consistent with our view that the left hemisphere plays a prominent role in forming inferences 
and the right hemisphere plays a prominent role in monitoring the validity of inferences. 
Finally, Goel (2015) offers a similar view of the differential roles of the left and right frontal lobes 
in reasoning, but emphasized the role of the right hemisphere in maintaining indeterminacy, rather 
than in resolving conflict. Indeterminacy is similar to uncertainty, but also applies to situations that 
do not involve probabilities. For example, if you are told that A > B and A > C, you cannot infer 
anything about the relationship between B and C, so the relationship is indeterminate. Goel posited 
that the right hemisphere plays a specialized role in maintaining and enhancing indeterminacy, 
while the left hemisphere attempts to eliminate indeterminacy at all costs. Maintaining 
indeterminacy can be especially useful in open-ended problems, in which locking onto an early 
hypothesis can be detrimental to finding the optimal solution. In particularly strong support of this 
view, one study (Mayseless & Shamay-Tsoory, 2015) found that simultaneously applying anodal 
tDCS to the right IFG and cathodal tDCS to the left IFG enhanced participants’ performance on a 
divergent verbal reasoning task. Additionally, there was no effect on reasoning when anodal 
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stimulation was applied to the left IFG and cathodal stimulation was applied to the right IFG, or 
when only anodal stimulation was applied to the right IFG, or when only cathodal stimulation was 
applied to the left IFG. A similar study (Luft, Zioga, Banissy, & Bhattacharya, 2017) found that 
cathodal tDCS to the left dlPFC, but not anodal or sham stimulation to the same region, was 
associated with solving more matchstick problems, and in particular the problems that required 
participants to relax their assumptions and “think outside of the box.”    
2. Limitations, challenges, and open questions 
The left hemisphere vs. right hemisphere distinction presented here may not hold in other 
domains of causal inference making, such as language comprehension or perception. For example, 
although the left hemisphere is generally superior at making judgments about causal structure, the 
right hemisphere has been shown to skillfully make perceptual (Corballis, 2003; Miller & Valsangkar-
Smyth, 2005; Roser et al., 2005) and possibly social (Wende et al., 2013) causal judgments and 
inferences. The right hemisphere may also play a prominent role in processes related to inference 
making, such as solving problems with insight (Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 2003; Kounios & Beeman, 
2014) or comprehending natural language (Jung-Beeman, 2005).  
According to our claim that the right hemisphere monitors the validity of inferences, a damaged 
or disconnected right hemisphere should lead to implausible or excessive inference making and 
possibly even delusions. However, split-brain patients and some patients with unilateral right 
hemisphere brain damage fail to develop delusional disorders (Coltheart, 2010; Gazzaniga, 2000). 
Coltheart’s two factor theory of delusions may offer an explanation as to why split-brain patients 
and patients with right hemisphere brain damage do not succumb to disorders in reasoning. As we 
stated earlier, Coltheart proposes that delusions require 1) an impairment that elicits some sort of 
explanation and 2) a dysfunctional belief evaluation system that fails to reject implausible 
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explanations for the initial impairment (Coltheart et al., 2011, 2010; Coltheart, 2010; McKay, 
Langdon, & Coltheart, 2007). We suggest that split-brain patients and unilateral right brain-
damaged patients may meet the second requirement but not the first. That is, these patients may 
have an impaired evaluation system but they fail to develop delusional beliefs because they lack a 
neurological impairment that warrants an explanation. Right hemisphere damage or isolation may 
therefore make a patient vulnerable to abnormal reasoning, but it does not necessarily precipitate 
delusional ideation; in other words, left hemisphere over-activity or right hemisphere under-activity 
is necessary, but not sufficient, for delusions to form. It is also likely that – although the right 
hemisphere plays a more prominent role in hypothesis evaluation – the left hemisphere retains 
some evaluative capabilities, which may prevent delusional beliefs from forming.  
Although several lines of evidence support our framework, some do not. Under our framework, 
the receipt of inconsistent evidence should preferentially activate regions in the right hemisphere, 
but Fugelsang & Dunbar (2005) found left-lateralized activations in subjects who were presented 
with evidence that conflicted a theory. Since this study utilized a block design, however, it is 
possible that it failed to capture the true neural activity associated with the presentation of 
contradictory evidence; the left lateralized activations may instead reflect inferential reasoning 
processes other than hypothesis evaluation and belief updating. A study by Vartanian & Goel (2005) 
also contradicts our predictions. They propose that the right ventrolateral PFC (vlPFC) supports 
unconstrained hypothesis generation, since they found that activity in the right vlPFC increases as 
the constraints of an anagram-solving task decrease. An alternative explanation for their results 
could be that the right vlPFC plays a role in monitoring the problem solving process or inhibiting 
unfruitful lines of reasoning, both of which would fit within our framework.  
The strongest evidence against our proposal stems from two transcranial magnetic stimulation 
(TMS) studies conducted by Tsujii and colleagues (Tsujii, Masuda, Akiyama, & Watanabe, 2010; 
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Tsujii, Sakatani, Masuda, Akiyama, & Watanabe, 2011). In both studies, TMS was applied to the left 
and right inferior frontal cortices of subjects prior to a deduction task that involved belief-logic 
conflicts. Since we postulate that the right hemisphere favors truth and real-world knowledge over 
logic, we would expect inhibition of the left vlPFC, but not the right vlPFC, to cause an over-reliance 
on prior beliefs. Contrary to our predictions, they found that right vlPFC disruption increased the 
influence of prior beliefs on logic (thus enhancing the belief-bias effect) and left vlPFC disruption 
eliminated the belief-bias effect. It is possible that the right hemisphere’s role in reasoning is not 
only to monitor, revise, and reject improbable hypotheses, as we have proposed, but also to inhibit 
information that is irrelevant to reasoning. In this case, disruption of an inhibitory right vlPFC would 
allow conflicting prior beliefs to bias reasoning, thus enhancing the belief-bias effect as Tsujii and 
colleagues found. Alternatively, it is possible that the targeted brain regions were not modulated as 
intended, even though the stimulation parameters used in the studies have been shown to reduce 
cortical excitability in motor cortex following stimulation (Robertson, Théoret, & Pascual-Leone, 
2003). In any case, additional studies using complementary neuromodulation techniques are 
needed to corroborate and expand on these findings.  
Patient studies provide much stronger support for hemispheric asymmetry in reasoning than 
neuroimaging studies using healthy individuals. There are several possible explanations for the 
apparent discrepancy between the patient literature and the neuroimaging literature. The first 
possibility is that lateralization is an artifact of abnormal brain functioning. Lateralization is 
exaggerated in brain-damaged and split-brain patients because the damaged (or disconnected) 
brain tissue 1) cannot contribute to reasoning and 2) may release contralateral brain regions from 
inhibition, thus amplifying the reasoning biases of the contralateral hemisphere (Braun, 2007). So 
although patients may exhibit lateralized reasoning, it is possible that neuroimaging captures the 
true state of the system, which is a bilateral, symmetric reasoning network. Alternatively, it is 
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possible that neuroimaging studies obfuscate a truly lateralized reasoning system because contrasts 
fail to isolate inference making or belief updating adequately. Indeed, many contrasts designed to 
identify brain regions associated with inference making are confounded with unrelated processes 
(Fangmeier et al., 2006; Kalbfleisch et al., 2007; Landmann et al., 2007). These contaminated 
processes may muddle neuroimaging results, making lateralized processes appear bilateral.  
C. Primary aims and rationale 
We propose that inferential reasoning strategies are subtly lateralized in the brain, such that 
cognitive processes in the left hemisphere tend to reduce uncertainty and those in the right 
hemisphere tend to resolve conflict (Marinsek, Turner, Gazzaniga, & Miller, 2014). These divergent 
reasoning strategies make the left hemisphere prone to create explanations, infer causality, and fill 
in gaps in information, and the right hemisphere prone to detect inconsistencies between 
hypotheses and other evidence and reject implausible hypotheses. We argue that, in the healthy 
brain, the different reasoning strategies of the left and right hemispheres create a flexible and 
balanced reasoning system. Furthermore, neural networks in the left or right hemispheres can be 
preferentially recruited in order to bias reasoning to meet task demands (making inferences more 
liberal or cautious, for example). Our framework is strongly supported by patient studies, including 
research on brain-damaged patients, delusional patients, and split-brain patients. However, 
neuroimaging and neurostimulation studies using healthy individuals provide less convincing 
evidence. To determine whether hemispheric lateralization contributes to healthy human reasoning, 
or whether it is an artifact of abnormal brain functioning in patients, we designed and carried out a 
series of neurostimulation and neuroimaging experiments.  
We used convergent approaches to test the idea that each hemisphere possesses different 
reasoning biases. Our experiments were designed with the following aims:  
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1. Establish causal relationships between reasoning biases and lateralized brain activity by 
observing how tDCS-induced hemispheric asymmetry influences participants’ reasoning 
behavior on a total of four reasoning tasks, one of which was designed to be amenable 
to cognitive modeling and three of which were designed to closely resemble real-world, 
nuanced reasoning scenarios. 
2. Identify brain networks that are active during uncertainty (which we predict will be 
mostly left-lateralized) and networks that are active when evidence conflicts beliefs 
(which we predict will be mostly right-lateralized) by recording participants’ brain 
activity with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) as they complete a novel 
probabilistic inference task. 
1. Stimulation design 
Given the fact that previous reports of hemispheric asymmetry in other domains have been 
found to be more apparent than real (as discussed in Miller, Kingstone, & Gazzaniga, 2002), it is 
crucial to use causal methods to test lateralized processing. Until now, few studies have attempted 
to establish causal relationships between reasoning and brain activity, and the few studies that have 
used neuromodulation to study reasoning have yielded mixed results: some studies support the 
predictions of our framework (Coltheart et al., 2019; Lupyan, Mirman, Hamilton & Thompson-Schill, 
2012; Sharot et al. 2012; Xue, Juan, Chang, Lu, & Dong, 2012) , some oppose them (Tsujii, Masuda, 
Akiyama, & Watanabe, 2010; Tsujii, Sakatani, Masuda, Akiyama, & Watanabe, 2011), and other 
studies find null results (Hecht, Walsh, & Lavidor, 2010).  
Existing transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) and transcranial direct current stimulation 
(tDCS) studies may conflict with each other because many rely on between-subjects designs and fail 
to model the current flow induced by the stimulation set-ups. In order to establish a clear link 
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between brain activity and reasoning, it is imperative to model how current is delivered to all brain 
regions and on an individual basis, since electrode placement, cortical folding, and skull shunting 
can drastically (and non-intuitively) alter the effects of stimulation (Miranda, Lomarev, & Hallett, 
2006; Nitsche et al., 2008, Datta et al., 2009). In order to circumvent the problems of previous 
studies, we used a within-subjects design and modeled the current flow induced by high-definition 
tDCS (HD-tDCS) for every participant. In the tDCS experiments, we temporarily modulated activity 
in participants’ left and right hemispheres and observed their performance in several novel 
reasoning tasks. In doing so, we aimed to 1) establish causal relationships between brain activity 
and reasoning behavior, 2) test our hypothesis that differences in hemispheric dominance lead to 
reasoning biases, and 3) conceptually replicate the results of studies on brain-damaged or 
delusional patients by comparing their performance to the participants’ performance.  
High-Definition Transcranial Direct Current Stimulation (HD-tDCS): tDCS is a neuromodulation 
technique in which a weak electrical current is applied to the scalp in order to temporarily modulate 
existing brain activity. The intensity of the electrical current used in tDCS protocols is too weak to 
induce action potentials directly (Nitsche et al., 2008, Stagg & Nitsche, 2012); instead, tDCS is 
thought to modulate spontaneous neuronal firing by altering neuronal resting membrane potentials 
(Nitsche & Paulus, 2000). Cathodal stimulation decreases (hyperpolarizes) the membrane potential, 
thus decreasing excitability and spontaneous firing, and anodal stimulation raises (depolarizes) the 
resting potential, thus increasing neuronal excitability (Nitsche & Paulus, 2000, Nitsche et al., 2008). 
tDCS has been shown to increase glutamate release in target brain areas during anodal stimulation 
(Hone-Blanchet, Edden, & Fecteau, 2016), polarize neurons and modulate responses to neuronal 
input (Chakraborty, Truong, Bikson, & Kaphzan, 2017), increase global mean field power (Lauro et 
al., 2014), and modulate cerebral perfusion in target brain areas (Stagg et al., 2013). Although the 
effects of tDCS are temporary, stimulation periods ranging from 9-13 minutes produce after-effects 
  29 
that last about one hour, and longer stimulation periods produce longer after-effects (Nitsche et al., 
2008). An especially attractive feature of tDCS is the fact that it can be incorporated into double-
blind, sham-controlled designs. Sham tDCS conditions are identical to active tDCS sessions except 
that current is only briefly applied to subjects’ scalps in order replicate the tingling effects of tDCS 
without altering brain activity.  
 Traditional tDCS set-ups use large rectangular sponge electrodes, which modulate current 
diffusely, stimulate regions outside of the target brain area, and fail to deliver peak current density 
to brain regions located directly under the sponge anode (Borckardt et al., 2012; Caparelli-Daquer 
et al., 2012). Several meta-analyses of traditional tDCS studies have found inconsistent results and 
null effects when results are averaged across studies (Horvath, Forte, & Carter, 2015A, Horvath, 
Forte, & Carter, 2015B; Jacobson & Koslowsky, 2012; Tremblay et al., 2014). These inconsistent 
results are likely due to the poor targeting and great variability inherent with sponge-based tDCS 
systems. 
To mitigate the shortcomings of traditional tDCS, we used high-definition tDCS (HD-tDCS). HD-
tDCS systems use compact electrodes (much like EEG electrodes) instead of traditional sponge 
electrodes, which increases the focal specificity of stimulation (Borckardt et al. 2012). HD-tDCS has 
been shown to modulate cortical excitabtilty (Kuo et al., 2013) and increase blood oxygenation 
inside but not outside of targeted brain areas (Muthalib, Besson, Rothwell, and Perrey, 2017).  We 
used the HD-Targets modeling software to create an HD-tDCS electrode montage that optimally 
delievered current to cortical targets. In addition to optimizing electrode placement at a group 
level, we created anatomical meshes of each participant’s brain, adapted the general electrode 
configuration to their unique cortical folding, modeled current flow in their brain, and used the 
estimates of cortical current densities as covariates in our behavioral analyses. Furthermore, we 
used an infrared camera positioning system to place the electrodes precisely across sessions and 
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across participants. These methods allow us to exert a greater level of control over the delivery of 
current and allow us to accout for individual differences in head size and shape, cerebrospinal fluid 
volume, fat content, skull thickness, and gyral folding, all which have been shown to influence the 
amount of current that reaches the cortical surface (Li, Uehara, & Hanakawa, 2015). We are unaware 
of any tDCS or HD-tDCS study that implemented a more thorough sitmulation protocol.  
Stimulation sites: tDCS was used to diffusely boost neural activity in the left or right inferior 
frontal gyrus (IFG; BA 45) while simultaneously inhibiting neural activity in the contralateral IFG, in 
order to mimic the hemispheric asymmetry present in patient groups and characterize the effects of 
hemispheric asymmetry on reasoning. The inferior frontal gyri were chosen as stimulation targets 
because these regions have been associated with reasoning in the past. Several studies indicate 
that the right inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) is recruited during hypothesis evaluation (Barbey & 
Patterson, 2011; Cools, Clark, Owen, & Robbins, 2002; Goel et al., 2000; Goel & Dolan, 2003; Goel, 
2007; Menenti et al., 2008; Stollstorff et al., 2012). Conversely, the left IFG is consistently activated 
during tasks related to hypothesis formation (Barbey & Patterson, 2011; D’Argembeau et al., 2013; 
Friese et al., 2008; Goel et al., 2000; Monti & Osherson, 2012; Rodriguez-Moreno & Hirsch, 2009).  
 
Figure 2: LH-bias, RH-bias, and sham stimulation conditions. 
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Figure 2 illustrates the general stimulation set-up. Each experiment included three stimulation 
conditions: a LH-bias stimulation condition, in which anodal HD-tDCS was applied to the left IFG 
and cathodal HD-tDCS was simultaneously applied to the right IFG; an RH-bias stimulation 
condition, in which anodal HD-tDCS was applied to the right IFG and cathodal HD-tDCS was 
simultaneously applied to the left IFG; and a sham condition, in which current was only transiently 
applied to the bilateral inferior frontal gyri. The LH-bias stimulation condition mimics left 
hemisphere hyperactivity (which may be comparable to patients with delusions or right hemisphere 
brain damage) and the RH-bias stimulation condition mimics right hemisphere hyperactivity (which 
may be comparable to patients with left hemisphere brain damage). The sham stimulation does not 
induce changes in brain activity, and thus served as a control.  
2. Predictions 
We predicted that inducing hemispheric asymmetry with HD-tDCS would produce some of the 
same reasoning biases in healthy individuals as those observed in different patient groups. 
Specifically, we predicted that LH-bias stimulation would make participants more certain of their 
beliefs and hypotheses. When participants were uncertain, we predicted that they would update 
their hypotheses to a greater extent under LH-bias stimulation than under RH-bias stimulation in 
order to become more certain, and when they were already certain, they would update their 
hypotheses to a lesser extent in order to maintain high levels of certainty. We predicted that RH-
bias stimulation would influence individuals’ responses to conflict, such that individuals would 
become more willing to revise their beliefs when they received conflicting evidence under RH-bias 
stimulation. We also expected that LH-bias and RH-bias stimulation would exert opposite effects on 
behavior compared to sham. That is, if LH-bias stimulation increased a particular behavior relative to 
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sham, we expected that RH-bias stimulation would decrease the same behavior relative to sham, 
and vice versa.  
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II. Experiment 1: Effects of HD-tDCS on probabilistic inference making 
A. Rationale 
The goal of this experiment was to temporarily induce hemispheric asymmetry with high-
definition transcranial direct current stimulation (HD-tDCS) and examine its effect on different 
aspects of reasoning, including evidence accumulation, evidence evaluation, belief updating, and 
decision making. Specifically, this experiment aimed to test the primary predictions of the 
hemispheric asymmetry framework that 1) left hemisphere networks are driven toward increasing 
and maintaining certainty and 2) right hemisphere networks are driven toward maintaining cohesion 
between evidence and beliefs. Testing both of these predictions requires a task in which 
participants make inferences under uncertainty and accumulate evidence that occasionally conflicts 
their prior hypotheses. The beads task, a probabilistic inference task that is commonly used to 
evaluate reasoning in patients with delusions, fulfills both of these requirements. In the beads task, 
an experimenter shows participants two jars containing different proportions of blue and white 
beads (for example, jar A contains 70% blue beads and jar B contains 70% white beads). The 
experimenter hides the jars, selects one of the jars, and then draws a bead from the selected jar and 
shows the participant the bead. The participants guess which jar was selected based on what beads 
were drawn and can request to see as many beads as they want. This task requires participants to 
make probabilistic inferences that are inherently uncertain, evaluate evidence that occasionally 
conflicts prior hypotheses, establish a threshold for stopping evidence collection, and, importantly, 
ideal belief updating can be modeled using Bayes theorem. Multiple studies have shown that 
delusional individuals request fewer beads than non-delusional individuals, who tend to be too 
conservative (Conway et al., 2002; Dudley, John, Young, & Over, 1997; Huq, Garety, Hemsley, & 
Park, 1988; Moritz & Woodward, 2005; Warman, Lysaker, Martin, Davis, & Haudenschield, 2007). 
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The task used in this experiment borrowed the structure of the beads task, but differed in 
several key ways. First, participants used a digital slider to continuously report their guesses. The 
digital slider can capture more precise guesses than a Likert scale or two-alternative forced choice 
and can potentially detect more subtle belief updates. Second, the stimuli were changed to 
engender more complex probabilistic reasoning and make the task more aligned with real-world 
decision making. Rather than guessing which jar was chosen based on the color of observed beads, 
participants in this task guessed which U.S. state was chosen based on the ethnicity of observed 
residents from the state. Third, participants were not informed about the probabilistic relationships 
between evidence and hypotheses (as in the beads task where participants are informed, for 
example, that there’s a 30% chance a white ball came from jar A and a 70% chance it came from jar 
B). Instead, and much like in the real world, this task required participants to rely on their own 
background knowledge and their implicit associations between evidence and candidate 
hypotheses.  
We predicted that HD-tDCS-induced hemispheric asymmetry would change participants’ 
reasoning behavior in alignment with our hemispheric asymmetry framework and that LH-bias 
stimulation and RH-bias stimulation would produce changes in opposite directions compared to 
sham. First, we predicted that LH-bias stimulation would make participants more certain and would 
materialize in 1) slider positions closer to either end of the track (associated with more certainty), 2) 
less evidence collection, and 3) a lower threshold for stopping evidence collection. Second, we 
predicted that LH-bias stimulation would make participants less sensitive to conflicts between 
beliefs and evidence, which would result in smaller backtracks in strong beliefs after receiving 
conflicting evidence. We made the opposite predictions for RH-bias stimulation.  
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B. Methods 
1. Participants 
26 individuals (18 females, mean age: 21, age range: 18-37) participated in the transcranial 
direct current stimulation (tDCS) experiment. Participants were recruited by sending emails to 
several undergraduate mailing lists and by posting a description of the study to an online 
Psychology participation system. There were strict eligibility criteria that ensured participants could 
safely undergo MRI and tDCS. Eligibility criteria included 1) no metal in the body, 2) no history of 
epilepsy, stroke, or brain damage, 3) no pacemaker or brain stimulator, 4) no dredlocks or irritation 
on the scalp near the electrode sites, and 5) no possibility of pregnancy. The screening form used in 
Villamar et al. (2013) was used to screen participants. Answering “yes” to any question excluded the 
individual from participating, with the exception of the question about medications. Only individuals 
taking psychological medications (such as for depression or anxiety) were excluded.  
To be selected to participate in the tDCS study, participants had to pass a behavioral prescreen 
in which they completed the state guessing task (described below) and a memory task for a 
separate experiment. A total of 151 participants completed the behavioral prescreen. To be 
selected to participate in the tDCS experiment, individuals had to meet all eligibility criteria, move 
the digital slider in at least 50% of the first six evidence presentations, and shift their decision 
criteria in the memory task. Participants were selected based on their use of the digital slider 
because many participants failed to move the slider at all before making a decision despite being 
instructed to move the slider whenever their belief changed. Eligible participants were paid $20 per 
hour for their participation in an initial MRI session and the three tDCS sessions. 
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2. Probabilistic inference task 
Participants completed a novel probabilistic inference task in which they had to rely on their 
background knowledge of U.S. state demographics to make inferences. Participants were told that 
the computer would randomly select one of two possible U.S. states at the beginning of each trial 
and their goal was to guess which state was selected. After a state was selected, the computer 
randomly selected one resident from the chosen state and presented the ethnicity of that resident 
for 3 seconds. Participants were truthfully told that the computer selected residents in accordance 
with 2010 census data, such that if the chosen state had 72% white residents, the computer would 
select a white resident with a probability of 0.72, and so on. After a resident’s ethnicity was 
presented, participants used a digital slider with the two possible U.S. state options at either end to 
report their best guess of which state was selected. Ethnicities continued to be presented every 
three seconds, and participants were told to update the slider whenever their guess (or belief) 
changed. After six residents were shown, a stop button appeared and participants were given the 
option to stop collecting evidence and submit their final guess. A maximum of 20 residents could 
be observed in every trial. Once participants clicked the stop button or viewed all 20 residents, they 
were prompted to choose which of the two U.S. states was selected and report how confident they 
were in their decision on a scale from 1-5, where 1=”low”, 2=”somewhat low”, 3=”moderate”, 
4=”somewhat high”, and 5=”high.” 
 
  
  37 
 
Figure 3: Stimuli presentation in the state guessing task. Participants were presented with 
ethnicities of residents of a mystery state and had to guess which state was selected. 
Participants used a digital slider to report their guesses.   
 
In order to encourage participants to use the slider throughout the evidence presentation, cash 
bonuses were offered based on the slider position. If the slider was in the very center of the track, 
no money was rewarded or penalized. The closer the slider was to the correct state, the more 
money participants were rewarded, up to $1.00. The closer the slider was to the incorrect state, the 
more money was penalized, up to -$1.00. Participants were told that the best way to maximize their 
bonus was to move the slider toward the state that they thought was correct and make the distance 
away from the center of the track proportional to their certainty. For every trial in the experiment, 
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one of the evidence presentations was randomly selected and the slider position for that piece of 
evidence was used to calculate the reward or penalty. The bonus amounts were summed, rounded 
up to the nearest dollar, and paid in cash at the end of each session. 
3. Stimuli creation 
Five U.S. states were used in this experiment: California, Iowa, Louisiana, New Mexico, and New 
York. These states were chosen to so that pairwise matchups between the states would vary in 
difficulty (for example, California vs. New York is a difficult matchup because the states share similar 
demographics, while Louisiana vs. New Mexico is an easier matchup). State demographics were 
pulled from the 2010 census (www.census.gov/2010census/data) and the following races/ethnicities 
were used: White, Black, Asian, Native American, and Hispanic. The percentages of the White, 
Black, Asian, and Native American residents in each state were based off of the “Alone” column in 
Table 4 of The White Population: 2014, Table 5 of The Black Population: 2010, Table 2 of The Asian 
Population: 2010, and Table 2 of The Native American and Alaska Native Population: 2010 
documents, respectively. The percentages of Hispanic residents in the five states in 2010 were 
taken from Table 2 of The Hispanic Population: 2010. Percentages that did not add up to 100% 
(due to residents reporting they did not identify as only one of these ethnicities) were normalized so 
that they added up to 100%. 
2500 trials were simulated by 1) randomly selecting two of the five U.S. states without 
replacement (the first state was designated as the correct state and the second state as the 
alternative state) and 2) randomly selecting 20 ethnicities with replacement based on proportions of 
each ethnicity in the correct state. Next, Bayes’ theorem was used to compute the probability that 
the correct state was selected at each observation: 
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Equation 1: Bayes equation for state-guessing experiment 
 
where statecor refers to the correct U.S. state, statealt refers to the alternate state, and eth refers to 
the presented resident’s ethnicity. The priors for the first resident in each sequence were set to 
p=0.5, and subsequent priors were set to the posterior for the previous resident. 
To ensure that the difficulties of the trials were similar across tDCS sessions, the Bayesian 
posterior time courses were grouped into clusters with similar trajectories using affinity propagation. 
Affinity propagation produced 10 clusters. Some of the trajectories within each cluster were not very 
representative of the mean trajectory of the cluster. These trials were weeded out by computing the 
sum of the squared residuals between each trajectory and its cluster’s mean trajectory and 
removing trials with a sum of squared residuals greater than 0.75. Trials were randomly selected 
from 8 of the biggest clusters and assigned to 6 stimuli sets (3 sessions x 2 time points). More trials 
were pulled from bigger clusters and fewer trials were pulled from smaller clusters. Each stimuli set 
consisted of 24 trials total. 
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Figure 4: Creation of the stimuli used in the state guessing task. 
 
4. Current flow modeling 
The Soterix HD-Targets software was used to determine the optimal electrode placement to 
deliver maximal current to the left and right inferior frontal gyri. The optimal electrode configuration 
consisted of only two electrodes, one electrode over the left IFG and one electrode over the right 
IFG. To account for variations in participants’ brain anatomy, we adapted this general electrode 
configuration for each participant. First, T1-weighted and T2-weighted anatomical scans were 
obtained for each participant with MRI. Then, the mri2mesh function from SimNIBS (Thielscher, 
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Antunes, & Saturnino, 2015) was used to convert the anatomical volumes into 3D meshes of the 
skin, skull, cerebrospinal fluid, segmented gray matter, and white matter. The segmented gray 
matter regions were loaded in Freeview and brain targets were manually defined as the surface RAS 
coordinates of the center of masses of the left and right inferior frontal gyrus, pars triangularis (BA 
45). The center of mass was estimated visually and care was taken to avoid defining a target near a 
sulcus. 
Figure 5: Pipeline for electrode configuration and current modeling. 
 
SimNIBS was used to do define the electrode locations and simulate current flow. The following 
parameters were used to define the electrodes: current: 2.00mA, shape: elliptical, size: 1.2cm 
diameter, type: electrode+gel, electrode thickness: 1.6mm, gel thickness: 8.4mm, electrode size 
ratio: 1.00, connector: whole surface. The surface RAS coordinates were used as the x, y, z 
coordinates of the electrode. The reference direction was defined as x, y-10, z. The coordinates 
were projected onto the scalp, and the resulting x,y, and z coordinates were used as the electrode 
coordinates. Two electrodes were defined, an anode over the left IFG and a cathode over the right 
IFG, and current flow was simulated. The current modeling results were viewed and validated in 
gmsh (Geuzaine & Remacle, 2009).  
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Figure 6: Individual differences in estimated current density at the cortical surface.  
5. Procedure 
Each participant completed three sessions: a LH-bias condition with a left anode and right 
cathode, a RH-bias condition with a right anode and left cathode, and a sham condition which 
served as a control. The stimulation sessions were completed at the same time of day and at least 
48 hours apart.  
At the beginning of every session, participants completed 24 trials of the task in a behavioral 
testing room. Then they were fitted with the electrodes. The Brainsight navigation system was used 
to register the participant’s head to their anatomical scan and locate the electrode coordinates on 
the participant’s temples, which were recorded with a marker. An empty electrode cap was used to 
mark the perimeters of each electrode and the skin within the electrode perimeter was swabbed 
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with alcohol. Gel-filled electrodes (Soterix Medical) were positioned within the electrode perimeters 
and taped in place. A reference electrode was taped on the forehead to determine the electrode 
connection qualities. The electrodes were connected to the stimulator: the reference electrode was 
inserted into channel C, the anode was inserted to channel 1 which was set to +2.0mA, and the 
cathode was inserted to channel 2 which was set to -2.0mA. If the electrode connection qualities 
were above 25K, the skin under the electrodes was swabbed with a cotton swab. In rare cases, the 
connection qualities could not get lower than 25K, so a cutoff of 40K was used. Participants were 
stimulated for a total of 20 minutes. During stimulation, current slowly ramped up in the first 30 
seconds, stayed constant at 2.0mA for 19 minutes, and slowly ramped down in the last 30 seconds. 
In the sham condition, the current ramped up and then back down in the first 60 seconds, stayed 
constant at about 0.05mA for 18 minutes, and then ramped up slowly and back down in the last 60 
seconds. The electrode setup was identical for the sham session. Odd-numbered participants were 
given left-anode sham stimulation and even-numbered participants were given right-anode sham 
stimulation. 30 seconds after the beginning of stimulation, participants were asked to describe the 
feeling and intensity of the sensations under the electrodes. The task began 90 seconds after the 
onset of the stimulation. Participants completed 24 trials of the state guessing task. If participants 
finished the task while the stimulation was still going, they were asked to report the sensations 
under the electrodes again.  
After the third session, participants completed an online survey that consisted of questions 
about motivation (McAuley, Duncan, & Tammen, 1989), handedness (Oldfield, 1971), political 
attitudes and belief superiority (Toner, Leary, Asher, & Jongman-Sereno, 2013), dogmatism 
(Altemeyer, 2002), and delusional ideation (Peters, Joseph, Day, & Garety, 2004). Participants also 
estimated the percentage of Native American, Asian, Black, Hispanic, and White residents living in 
California, Iowa, Louisiana, New Mexico, and New York.  
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6. Data analysis 
All analyses were performed in Python using the Pandas, Numpy, Sci-kit learn, and statsmodels 
packages.  
Participants’ demographic estimates were used to compute the expected Bayesian posteriors 
for each observation by substituting participants’ estimates for the P(eth|state) terms in Equation 1. 
In cases where participants’ percentages did not sum to 100%, their estimates were scaled so that 
they summed to 100%.  
Multiple linear regression was used to determine the effects of stimulation on 1) the amount of 
evidence collected and 2) the Bayesian posteriors when evidence collection stopped. The design 
matrices consisted of the following regressors: block number (0: baseline, 1: during stimulation); the 
LH session; the RH session; LH-bias (interaction between block * LH session);  RH-bias (interaction 
between block * RH session); LH-bias intensity (demeaned cortical current densities for each 
participant * LH-bias);  RH-bias intensity (demeaned cortical current densities for each participant * 
RH-bias); degree of right-handedness for each participant (continuous); dummy variables for stimuli 
sets 1 and 3; trial number; trial difficulty (1 - weighted sum of Bayesian posteriors); dogmatism score 
for each participant; self-reported effort for each participant; self-reported skill for each participant; 
and the delusional ideation score for each participant. Regressors were normalized so that they 
ranged from 0 to 1. Beta values were computed with Ordinary Least Squares and a Bonferroni 
correction was applied to correct for multiple comparisons (p<0.003).  
Trajectory regression analysis was used to determine the effect of tDCS on certainty dynamics. 
Certainty was operationalized as the distance away from the slider midpoint and the certainty at 
each observation was normalized across trials by subtracting the certainty associated with the ideal 
Bayesian posterior. Trajectories were defined as the certainty values associated with the first seven 
residents of each trial. The trajectory regression analysis consisted of clustering certainty trajectories 
  45 
into groups and using multinomial logistic regression to predict group membership. To determine 
the number of groups to use, k-means clustering was used to cluster the certainty trajectories into 1 
to 10 groups. Each group of clusters was scored by summing the distances between each point and 
the cluster center, and the elbow method was used to select the optimal group size (in this case, 
k=2). The certainty trajectories were clustered into two groups and logistic regression was used to 
determine what factors predicted group membership. The same design matrix was used as before. 
To determine how prior beliefs and evidence affect participants’ belief updates, continuous 
heatmaps were created that denoted participants’ average belief update over the full range of prior 
belief certainties (from completely uncertain to completely certain) and evidence consistencies (from 
highly disconfirmatory to highly confirmatory of the prior). The magnitude of the belief updates was 
equal to the absolute difference in slider position before vs. after each observation and the 
direction of the update was normalized so that positive values indicate that the belief changed in 
the same direction as the prior (so, 0.8 Iowa/ 0.2 New Mexico à 0.9 Iowa/ 0.1 New Mexico) and 
negative values indicate that the belief changed in the opposite direction as the prior (so, 0.8 Iowa/ 
0.2 New Mexico à 0.7 Iowa/ 0.3 New Mexico). The magnitude of the evidence was equal to the 
absolute log likelihood ratio and the direction of the evidence was normalized so that positive 
values indicate that the evidence confirmed the prior and negative values indicate that the evidence 
disconfirmed the prior. For each block and each condition, a continuous heatmap was generated by 
summing Gaussian kernels with heights equal to the belief update, x coordinates equal to the prior 
belief certainty, and y coordinate equal to the evidence consistency for all observations. Heatmaps 
were subtracted from each other to account for baseline and sham stimulation. 
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C. Results 
1. Sensations and side-effects of HD-tDCS 
Participants most commonly reported that the stimulation felt like tingling, itching, pins and 
needles, burning, stinging, prickling, pressure, or poking (Figure 7). Fewer sensations were reported 
after the task was finished but before stimulation ended. Sensations intensities ranged from very 
mild to moderate. An “intense” rating was only used once to describe intense itching. Sensations 
were more intense 30 seconds into stimulation than several minutes into stimulation when 
participants finished the task (Figure 8). Sham was associated with milder sensations compared to 
RH-bias stimulation pre- task and compared to both LH-bias and RH-bias stimulation post-task, but 
these differences were not significant after correcting for multiple comparisons (Mann-Whitney U 
test: pre:RH>SH statistic=217.0, p=0.02, post:RH>SH statistic=155.5, p=0.02, and post:LH>SH 
statistic=178.5, p=0.03). 
 
Figure 7: Reported sensations during stimulation. The pre-task sensations were reported 
approximately 30 seconds into stimulation and the post-task sensations were reported after 
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participants finished the task (if they finished before stimulation ended). Participants could 
report more than one type of sensation.  
 
Figure 8: Sensation intensities before and after the state guessing task in each stimulation 
condition. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
2. Demographic estimates  
Every participant estimated the demographic makeup of the five U.S. states used in the 
experiment. Their estimates were used to calculate individualized ideal Bayesian posteriors (and, 
consequently, ideal slider positions and certainties) for every observation and every trial. The 
posteriors calculated with participants’ demographic estimates were strongly correlated to those 
calculated with the true demographics from the 2010 census (r=0.596, p<0.001), but the 
relationship was certainty not perfect (Figure 9). 
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Figure 9: Comparison between the Bayesian posteriors calculated with participants' 
demographic estimates vs. the true 2010 demographics. Posteriors for observations at the 
middle and end of each sequence are predominately p=1, so only posteriors for the first 6 
observations are included in this plot to aid visualization.   
 
3. Amount of evidence collected 
We predicted that the LH-bias stimulation would drive participants to become more certain of 
their guesses early on and thus stop evidence collection earlier than in the sham or RH-bias 
stimulation conditions. Contrary to our predictions, we found no evidence that the stimulation 
affected the amount of evidence participants collected compared to baseline (LH>baseline: -0.18 ± 
1.15, SHAM>baseline: -0.03 ± 1.22, RH>baseline: -0.11 ± 1.31; LH>RH Wilcoxon signed-rank test: 
T=168.5, p=0.858).   
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Figure 10: Amount of additional evidence collected compared to baseline and sham stimulation 
(n=26 participants). 
 
We used multiple linear regression to examine the relationship between the amount of 
evidence collected and the stimulation conditions after taking additional factors into account, 
including individual differences in cortical current density (Figure 11). We predicted that RH-bias 
stimulation and LH-bias stimulation would be associated with more and less evidence collection 
compared to sham, respectively, and that these effects would be more pronounced with greater 
cortical current density. We found that greater cortical current density was associated with 
collecting more evidence in both the LH-bias and RH-bias conditions. The relationships between 
each participant’s estimated cortical current density and average amount of evidence collected in 
each condition are presented in Figure 12. Consistent with the regression results, it is apparent that 
the two active stimulation sessions are associated with slightly less evidence collection on average 
(represented by the dotted lines), but evidence collection increases as cortical current density 
increases.   
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Figure 11: Linear regression results for amount of evidence collected. Values in black are 
significant after correcting for 17 comparisons with a Bonferroni correction (t>2.98, p<0.003).  
 
 
Figure 12: Relationships between cortical current density and the amount of evidence collected 
in each stimulation condition. Each point represents one participant and only the data from the 
second block (during stimulation) is presented. Shaded regions denote 95% confidence 
intervals. Note: cortical current density is not expected to be correlated with any behavioral 
measure in the sham condition, since no stimulation is delivered.  
Several other factors influenced evidence collection. As expected, participants collected more 
evidence in trials that were more difficult (when the evidence did not point strongly toward one 
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state or the other). Several participant measures also accounted for differences in evidence 
collection. Higher dogmatism scores and higher self-reports of skill at the task where associated 
with collecting more evidence, while more extreme right-handedness and greater delusional 
ideation scores were associated with collecting less evidence.   
4. Threshold for stopping evidence collection 
We predicted that, compared to baseline and sham stimulation, LH-bias stimulation would be 
associated with a requiring a lower threshold of evidence and RH-bias stimulation would be 
associated with requiring a higher threshold of evidence before stopping evidence collection. To 
test this prediction, we computed the ideal Bayesian posterior for the state that the participant 
selected at the final evidence presentation. We restricted the analysis to trials in which participants 
decided to stop collecting evidence (that is, the trials in which the participant ran out of evidence 
were discarded) and trials in which the final decision was aligned with the preponderance of 
evidence (that is, the trials in which the participants selected the state with an estimated posterior < 
0.5 were discarded). There were no differences between evidence thresholds compared to baseline 
(LH>baseline: -0.008 ± 0.058, SHAM>baseline: -0.001 ± 0.049, RH>baseline: 0.002 ± 0.042; LH>RH 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test: T=174.0, p=0.969).  
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Figure 13: Threshold for stopping evidence collection compared to baseline and sham (n=26 
participants).  
We ran a regression analysis with the same design matrix to examine the influence of additional 
factors on participants’ evidence thresholds. We found that, as expected, greater RH-bias intensities 
were associated with higher thresholds to stop evidence collection (Figure 14). The positive 
relationship between stimulation intensity and evidence threshold in the RH-bias condition is 
illustrated in Figure 15. We also found that, similar to before, trial difficulty and right-handedness 
were associated with lower evidence thresholds and self-reported skill was associated with higher 
thresholds.  
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Figure 14: Linear regression results for threshold used to stop evidence collection. Values in 
black are significant after correcting for 17 comparisons with a Bonferroni correction (t>2.98, 
p<0.003). 
 
Figure 15: Relationships between cortical current density and evidence thresholds in each 
stimulation condition. Each point represents one participant and only the data from the second 
block (during stimulation) is presented. Shaded regions denote 95% confidence intervals. Note: 
cortical current density is not expected to be correlated with any behavioral measure in the 
sham condition, since no stimulation is delivered.  
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5. Certainty throughout the evidence presentation 
Certainty was operationalized as the distance away from the midpoint of the digital slider. 
Certainty values ranged from 0 at the slider midpoint and increased linearly up to 0.5 at either end 
of the slider. We predicted that participants would endorse more certain state guesses under LH-
bias stimulation compared to RH-bias stimulation, especially early on in each trial before much 
evidence was accumulated. Only the certainties associated with the first 7 residents of each trial 
were analyzed since all participants observed those residents. The expected certainty -- equal to the 
certainty associated with the ideal Bayesian posterior -- was computed for each observation and 
subtracted from participants’ certainty values in order to account for differences in evidence 
strength across trials. After normalizing for expected certainty, baseline, and sham stimulation, the 
certainty trajectories under LH-bias and RH-bias stimulation were compared. Compared to RH-bias 
stimulation, LH-bias stimulation was associated with greater certainty, but only early on in the trial 
(Figure 16 A). A similar pattern emerged when the data was grouped by stimuli ID rather than 
participant ID (Figure 16 B). However, none of the certainty differences between LH-bias and RH-
bias stimulation were significantly different from zero after using a Bonferonni correction to correct 
for multiple comparisons.   
  55 
 
Figure 16: Certainty associated with the first 6 observations, normalized by expected certainty, 
baseline, and sham. A. Each point represents the mean across participant means (n=26). B. 
Each point represents the mean across stimuli means (n=72 sequences). Error bars represent 
standard error. 
We used trajectory regression analysis to determine how, if at all, tDCS affected how certainty 
changed throughout the course of the trial. First, the ideal certainty (defined as the certainty 
associated with the ideal Bayesian posterior) for each observation was subtracted from the certainty 
values in order to normalize certainty trajectories across trials. The normalized certainty trajectories 
were clustered into two groups using k-means clustering (Figure 17). The trials in the first cluster, 
named “ideal”, were associated with trajectories that were close to the ideal certainty levels. On 
average, the certainties were slightly lower than ideal at the very beginning of the trial and slightly 
higher than ideal later on. The trials in the second group, named “uncertain”, were associated with 
lower certainty than ideal throughout the first seven observations.  
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Figure 17: K-means clustering of certainty trajectories in preparation for trajectory analysis. 
Multinomial logistic regression was used to determine what factors made it more likely that any 
given trial would be classified as an “uncertain” trajectory as opposed to “ideal” trajectory (Figure 
18). We found that trial difficulty was more predictive of “ideal” trajectories than “uncertain” 
trajectories. Only two participant measures were significantly associated with trajectory type: self-
reported ratings of effort on the task and higher endorsement of delusional ideas were both more 
predictive of the “uncertain” trajectories than “certain” trajectories. Finally, we found that greater 
RH-bias intensity (defined as greater cortical current density in the RH-bias stimulation condition) 
was more predictive of the “uncertain” trajectory than the “ideal” trajectory. To visualize the 
relationship between trajectory type and cortical current density, Figure 19 shows scatter plots of 
the fraction of “uncertain” trajectory types for each participant compared to their estimated cortical 
current density for each stimulation condition. 
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Figure 18: Linear regression results for threshold used to stop evidence collection. Values in 
black are significant after correcting for 17 comparisons with a Bonferroni correction (t>2.98, 
p<0.003). 
 
Figure 19: Relationships between cortical current density and fraction of “uncertain” trajectory 
types. Each point represents one participant and only the data from the second block (during 
stimulation) is presented. Shaded regions denote 95% confidence intervals.  
6. Belief updating after belief-evidence conflicts  
Based on the hemispheric lateralization framework, we expected that tDCS would have the 
most divergent effects in situations when evidence contradicted strong prior beliefs. In these 
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situations, we predicted that LH-bias stimulation would bias participants toward maintaining a high 
level of certainty so participants would be less likely to change their beliefs after receiving 
conflicting evidence. Conversely, we predicted that RH-bias stimulation would make participants 
more responsive to conflicting evidence and more likely to update their beliefs until they were more 
in line with the new evidence. To test these predictions, we selected time points in which 1) 
participants had a strong prior belief that a particular state was selected (p<0.1 or p>0.9) and 2) 
they observed a resident that was 3x or more likely to come from the opposite state. Participants’ 
belief changes in these instances were compared between blocks and between conditions. Belief 
change was operationalized as the distance between the slider positions before vs. after receiving 
the conflicting evidence and was normalized to participants’ prior belief such that positive belief 
changes indicate the participant became more certain of their state guess and negative changes 
indicate the participant became less certain (or moved closer to the opposite state). In all blocks, 
conflicting evidence was associated with moving the slider closer toward the opposite state, in the 
same direction as the conflicting evidence (Figure 20). There were no differences in belief updates 
in the sham or RH-bias condition compared to baseline, but LH-bias was associated with a 
significantly larger average belief update compared to baseline (t=3.03, p=0.003).  
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Figure 20: Change in belief after receiving conflicting evidence. Each bar represents the 
average change in the slider position for observations that conflicted a strongly held belief. The 
number of observations per bar ranges from n=97 to n=158. Negative belief change values 
indicate that the slider was moved in the opposite direction from the prior (that is, if a 
participant initially thought state A was selected, but then moved the slider more toward state 
B). Error bars represent standard error.  
 
One important caveat of this analysis is that it is sensitive to the cutoffs used for prior belief 
strength and evidence conflict. To obviate the need for cutoffs, participants’ belief updates were 
computed over the full range of prior belief certainties (from completely uncertain to completely 
certain) and evidence consistencies (from highly disconfirmatory to highly confirmatory of the prior). 
For each block and each condition, a continuous heatmap was generated by summing Gaussian 
kernels with heights equal to the belief update, x coordinates equal to the prior belief certainty, and 
y coordinates equal to the evidence consistency for all observations. According to our framework, 
the left hemisphere is biased toward reducing and maintaining certainty, so we predicted that LH-
bias stimulation would make participants update their beliefs more when certainty is low but less 
when certainty is high compared to baseline (Figure 21). Similarly, we proposed the right 
hemisphere applies a “cognitive brake” when evidence conflicts strong beliefs, so we predicted 
that, compared to baseline, RH-bias stimulation would make participants more likely to backtrack 
on their beliefs in cases where they were certain and received disconfirmatory evidence. 
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Figure 21: Predictions of the effect of LH-bias and RH-bias stimulation on belief updating 
according to prior belief certainty and evidence consistency. 
Compared to baseline, LH-bias stimulation was generally associated with more extreme 
updates, regardless of prior belief certainty. We found no evidence that RH-bias stimulation was 
associated with larger backtracks when evidence conflicted strong prior beliefs. In fact, compared to 
LH-bias stimulation, RH-bias stimulation was associated with less backtracking after belief-evidence 
conflicts (Figure 22).  
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Figure 22: Normalized belief updates according to prior certainty and evidence consistency. 
Areas in blue denote regions where the slider was updated in the same direction as the prior 
and areas in red denote regions where the slider was updated in the opposite direction (that is, 
a backtrack). 
Finally, the distribution of observations across belief certainties and evidence consistencies 
were compared between stimulation conditions (Figure 23). Compared to baseline, all three 
stimulation conditions were associated with fewer uncertain observations and more observations 
with moderate to high certainty. Likewise, and consistent with our predictions, LH-bias stimulation 
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was associated with fewer uncertain observations and more moderately to highly certain 
observation compared to RH-bias stimulation.  
 
Figure 23: Distribution of observations according to prior certainty and evidence consistency. 
Areas in white and black denote regions or more or fewer observations, respectively.  
D. Discussion 
One of our primary predictions was that LH-bias stimulation would drive participants toward 
being more certain, which would result in participants collecting less evidence and adopting a lower 
threshold to stop evidence collection. Conversely, we predicted that, under RH-bias stimulation, 
participants would exhibit less certainty and would require higher evidentiary thresholds for 
stopping evidence collection. Our results were consistent with our predictions for RH-bias 
stimulation: greater cortical current density in the RH-bias condition was significantly associated with 
1) collecting more evidence, 2) adopting a higher threshold for stopping evidence collection, and 3) 
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less certainty than ideal throughout the beginning of the trial. Although there was some indication 
that LH-bias stimulation was associated with greater certainty (Figure 16 and Figure 23), we also 
found that greater LH-bias intensity was associated with more evidence collection, which was 
contrary to our predictions. We did not find any significant effects of LH-bias intensity on evidence 
thresholds or certainty trajectories, although the directions of the effects were also opposite of our 
predictions.  
One possibility for the discrepancy between our predictions and the results for the LH-bias 
stimulation is that requiring participants to view at least six residents before stopping evidence 
collection concealed early differences between conditions and perhaps differences would have 
emerged if participants were allowed to stop evidence collection at any time. As shown in Figure 
16, the largest differences in certainty between LH-bias stimulation and RH-bias stimulation 
occurred early on in the trial when participants were not allowed to stop collecting evidence. By the 
time participants were allowed to stop collecting evidence after observation 6, the certainties for 
the two stimulation conditions were similar. It’s possible that LH-bias stimulation would be 
associated with less evidence collection if participants were given the option to stop evidence 
collection early on in the trial when differences in certainty were more pronounced.  
The reason participants were required to observe at least six residents was to ensure that a full 
dataset could be analyzed for at least a subset of observations. Allowing participants to stop 
evidence collection at any time would hinder direct comparisons of observations across trials, 
participants, blocks, and conditions, partly because it would produce unequal sample sizes, but also 
because it could produce a dropout bias. For example, the effect of stimulation on participants’ 
certainty trajectories could not be analyzed because there would be a drop out of trials with each 
additional observation and the drop outs would be confounded with certainty. Six residents were 
chosen as the minimum number of residents based on initial pilot data in which participants 
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collected more residents on average. Participants may have collected fewer observations in this 
experiment compared to the pilot experiment due to different task demands, differences in trial 
difficulty, or greater familiarization with the task. To mitigate floor effects in the future, the number 
of required observations could be reduced to only 2, 3, or 4 residents, the trial difficulty could be 
increased to encourage participants to collect more evidence, bonuses based on trial accuracy 
could be given to motivate participants to be more certain before making a final guess, or an 
observation minimum could be applied to only half of the trials.  
Secondly, we predicted that RH-bias stimulation would make participants more sensitive to 
conflicts between evidence and beliefs and more likely to revise strong beliefs after receiving 
conflicting evidence. We found no evidence that RH-bias stimulation made participants more 
sensitive to belief-evidence conflict and, in fact, we found that participants were less likely to revise 
their strongly held beliefs after receiving conflicting evidence compared to LH-bias stimulation. LH-
bias stimulation was associated with significantly larger backtracks in strongly held beliefs after 
receiving conflicting evidence compared to baseline, while there were no significant differences in 
backtracks in RH-bias stimulation compared to baseline. Likewise, comparing belief updates over 
the full range of prior certainties and evidence types showed that LH-bias stimulation was 
associated with larger backtracks compared to RH-bias stimulation when prior beliefs were strong 
and evidence was conflicting.  
It is possible that RH-bias stimulation did not produce greater belief updating after belief-logic 
conflicts because this task did not engender the same sort of belief-logic conflicts as those reported 
in the literature. Although we use the term “strong belief” to denote slider positions near either end 
of the track, these are not strong beliefs in the normal sense of the phrase. Participants’ “certain 
beliefs” in this experiment pale in comparison to their “certain beliefs” in real life, especially 
compared to beliefs about politics or religion, for example. In short, it is possible that the belief-
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evidence conflicts participants encountered in this experiment did not produce enough conflict to 
trigger a right-lateralized “cognitive brake.” To test this possibility, stimuli with more meaning and 
real-world applicability were developed and used in a second tDCS experiment.  
Finally, we found that participants who scored higher on the delusional ideation scale collected 
less evidence on average, which is consistent with the patient literature that finds that delusional 
patients exhibit a strong “jump to conclusions bias” and collect fewer beads than controls in the 
beads task. Interestingly, greater delusional ideation was also associated with the “uncertain” 
certainty trajectory. It’s unclear why delusional ideation is associated with both less evidence 
collection and less certainty throughout the evidence presentation (while having no effect on 
evidence threshold), but it is possible that participants with higher delusional ideation have a poorer 
meta-cognitive assessment of their certainty levels or, perhaps even more likely, do not faithfully 
indicate their true certainty levels by moving the slider.  
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III. Experiment 2: Effects of HD-tDCS on real-world reasoning 
A. Rationale 
In Marinsek et al. (2014), we argued that subtle lateralized processing – if present – may 
contribute toward a more flexible reasoning system that can easily adapt to contextual reasoning 
demands. For example, situations requiring caution and a high standard of evidence may benefit 
from biasing right PFC networks while situations that favor liberal inference making and penalize 
uncertainty may benefit from biasing left PFC networks. If this is the case, it follows that if we 
artificially bias activity to the left PFC or right PFC, we should observe changes in how participants 
reason in realistic, nuanced scenarios. 
One drawback of the state guessing task is that it may be too abstract, too inconsequential, or 
too far removed from real-world reasoning to elicit the reasoning processes that we make 
predictions about. Although we took some steps to make the task more ecologically valid than the 
original beads task (for example, by expanding the number of evidence types and requiring 
participants to rely on their background knowledge to make inferences), the task may fall short of 
capturing real-world, flexible reasoning. In particular, the task may fail to produce salient belief-
evidence conflicts that we predicted would lead to divergent behavior under LH-bias and RH-bias 
stimulation. Since the inferences and guesses that participants formed were likely much more 
pliable and inconsequential than participants’ real beliefs, it’s possible that disconfirmatory 
evidence would produce less conflict in the state guessing task than in the real world.  
In this experiment, we again asked participants to make decisions based on their background 
knowledge and new, sometimes disconfirmatory, evidence, but used reasoning scenarios that are 
more deeply embedded in real-world contexts. The first set of scenarios required participants to 
judge whether criminal defendants were guilty of a crime based on evidence from real criminal 
investigations and the second set of scenarios required participants to vote on hypothetical ballot 
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measures after reading arguments in favor or in opposition to them. Both of these scenarios have 
important consequences in the real world. Voters must weigh conflicting evidence when deciding 
whom to elect to powerful positions in government and whether or not to vote propositions into 
law. Likewise, jurors are required to make decisions based on a great deal of conflicting evidence 
and risk convicting an innocent person or letting a guilty person go free. Even though people do 
not vote or sit on juries in their daily lives, many people reason about similar scenarios, albeit to a 
lesser extent, on a daily basis when forming opinions and judgments about personal or current 
events.  
In a final task, participants had to decide whether a news headline described a real event that 
actually happened or a fake event that was made-up. To do so, participants had to judge how likely 
an event was true based on their knowledge of the world (that is, they were essentially tasked with 
estimating the likelihood ratio in Bayes’ rule). Although these judgments may appear to be easy, 
they can be quite difficult since real, verifiable events may be bizarre and made-up events may 
appear plausible, especially if they are consistent with one’s worldview. Indeed, the prevalence of 
erroneous beliefs due to accepting fake news as real is widespread: a 2017 Public Policy Poll 
reported that 32% of Americans (including 60% of Trump supporters) believe that millions of people 
voted illegally for Hillary Clinton in the 2016 presidential election, 42% of Americans (including 73% 
of Trump supporters) believe George Soros paid people to protest Trump, and 14% of Trump 
supporters believe Hillary Clinton is involved in a child sex ring run out of a pizza restaurant in 
Washington D.C. All of these stories are linked to fake news articles that have been thoroughly 
debunked. The goal of the fake news task wasn’t necessarily to test how well participants can 
discriminate between real and fake headlines, but instead to explore whether biasing neural activity 
to the left or right hemisphere biased participants’ criterion for believing new information.  
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B. Methods 
1. Participants 
24 individuals (16 females, mean age: 21.4, age range: 19 to 37) participated in the transcranial 
direct current stimulation experiment. All participants who participated in the first tDCS experiment 
were invited to participate in this experiment, and 17 out of 26 participants chose to participate 
again. The remaining participants were recruited from a pool of individuals who had passed a 
screening process that ensured they could follow task instructions adequately and they could safely 
be scanned with MRI and stimulated with tDCS and TMS (the selection process is described in 
detail in section II.A.1). Participants were paid $20 per hour for their participation in the experiment.   
2. Tasks 
Participants completed three tasks during stimulation, each of which are described below.  
Criminal Court Case Scenarios: Participants were instructed to imagine that they were sitting on 
a jury and they needed to decide whether a defendant was guilty or not guilty. At the beginning of 
each trial, participants were given a very concise overview of the criminal court case, for example: 
“George Allen stands trial for raping and murdering a young court reporter in her home” (Figure 
24). Participants then used a digital slider to report their opinion to the question, “Is George Allen 
guilty of rape and murder?”. The leftmost point of the slider was labeled “definitely not guilty” and 
the rightmost point was labeled “definitely guilty.” The mouse cursor and slider were positioned in 
the center of the slider track at the beginning of every trial. Participants used the mouse to move 
the slider back and forth along the track and clicked the mouse button to submit their response. 
Participants were then presented with crime scene details. Three pieces of evidence suggested that 
the defendant was innocent (for example, “A fingerprint thought to belong to the attacker did not 
match any of Allen’s fingerprints.”) and three pieces of evidence suggested that the defendant was 
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guilty (for example, “Semen found at the crime scene contained antigens that are similar to the 
antigens in Allen’s blood.”) The order of the crime scene evidence was counterbalanced across 
trials and across participants. After each piece of evidence was presented, participants again 
reported their opinion of the defendant’s guilt with the digital slider. After all six pieces of evidence 
were presented, participants were given a two-alternative forced choice between deciding whether 
the defendant was “guilty” or “not guilty.” Participants also rated how confident they were that 
they made the correct decision on a scale from 1-5, where: 1=low, 2=somewhat low, 3=moderate, 
4=somewhat high, and 5=high. 
 
Figure 24: Example of stimuli from criminal court case scenarios. 
  70 
Crime details were taken from the cases published by the Innocence Project 
(www.innocenceproject.org). In each case, the defendant was convicted of the crime but the 
conviction was later overturned when DNA evidence proved that the defendant was innocent. 
These cases made for excellent stimuli because the crime scene evidence was often conflicting and 
ambiguous. 48 court case scenarios were created with 6 pieces of evidence each. A separate group 
of 48 participants completed the court case task on testing computers without receiving any 
stimulation. The ratings of these participants were used to determine which pieces of evidence were 
the most convincing by solving for the likelihood ratio in Bayes’ rule:  
 
Equation 2: Adaptation of Bayes' rule to estimate persuasiveness of crime evidence. 
Like before, the slider position before the evidence was presented was used to estimate the 
prior probabilities of P(guilty) and P(innocent), and the slider position after the evidence was 
presented was used to estimate the posterior probabilities. The natural log of the likelihood ratio 
was used as an estimate of how convincing a crime scene detail was. Positive log likelihood ratios 
indicate that the evidence made participants more likely to give a guilty verdict, and negative log 
likelihood ratios made participants more likely to give a non-guilty verdict.  
The 48 criminal court cases were divided into 3 groups with 16 court cases each. There was very 
little variation between participants’ initial beliefs, so the court cases were sorted into groups based 
on how the evidence as a whole was convincing of guilt or innocence (as measured by the average 
log likelihood ratio associated with each court case). The three stimuli groups did not significantly 
differ in prior opinion, final opinion, overall log likelihood ratio, proportion of guilty verdicts, 
confidence, or reaction time.  
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Voter Ballot Scenarios: Participants were instructed to imagine that they were at the ballot box 
and they needed to vote whether or not to pass a ballot measure and make it a law. In each trial, 
participants were given a brief overview of a proposed law and asked to indicate their current 
opinion with a digital slider (Figure 25). For example, participants were told “You are voting on a 
law that will lower the drinking age to 18.” and used the digital slider to report their opinion to the 
question, “Should the drinking age be lowered to 18?”. In every trial, the leftmost point of the 
slider was labeled “definitely no” and the rightmost point was labeled “definitely yes.” The mouse 
cursor and slider were positioned in the center of the slider track at the beginning of every trial. 
Participants used the mouse to move the slider back and forth along the track and clicked the 
mouse button to submit their response. After indicating their baseline opinion, participants were 
asked to rate how much they had thought about the issue before that day on a 1-6 scale, where: 
1=not at all, 2=very little, 3=a little bit, 4=a fair amount, 5= a good amount, and 6=a whole lot. 
Next, participants were shown two arguments in favor of the proposed law and two arguments in 
opposition to it. The order of the arguments was counterbalanced across trials and across 
participants. Participants reported their opinion of the ballot measure with the digital slider after 
each argument was presented. After all four arguments were presented, participants were given a 
two-alternative forced choice between voting “yes” or “no” on the ballot measure. Participants also 
rated how confident they were that they made the best decision on a scale from 1-5, where: 1=low, 
2=somewhat low, 3=moderate, 4=somewhat high, and 5=high. 
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Figure 25: Example stimuli from ballot measure task. 
 
Ballot measures and associated arguments were gathered from procon.org, ballotpedia.org, 
and voter information guides. 48 ballot measures were created with 6 arguments each (3 pro 
arguments and 3 con arguments). A separate group of 48 participants completed the voter ballot 
task on testing computers without receiving any stimulation. The ratings of these participants were 
used to determine which arguments were most convincing by solving for the likelihood ratio in 
Bayes’ rule:  
 
Equation 3: Adaptation of Bayes' rule to estimate the persuasiveness of each argument. 
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The slider position before an argument was presented was used to estimate the prior 
probabilities of P(yes) and P(no), and the slider position after an argument was presented was used 
to estimate the posterior probabilities, P(yes|argument) and P(no|argument). The natural log of the 
likelihood ratio was used as an estimate of how persuasive an argument was. Positive log likelihood 
ratios indicate that the argument made participants more likely to vote yes on the ballot measure, 
and negative log likelihood ratios made participants more likely to vote no on the ballot measure. 
To reduce the time of the task during stimulation, the least convincing pro argument (with the 
lowest average log likelihood ratio) and least convincing con argument (with the highest average 
log likelihood ratio) were excluded for each ballot measure, resulting in four arguments per ballot 
measure. 
Ballot measures varied greatly based on 1) how much people knew about the topic, cared 
about the topic, and considered the topic beforehand ( for example, participants knew more about 
abortion than returning to the gold standard), 2) participants’ initial opinions (for example, most 
participants were strongly against allowing performance enhancing drugs in sports and strongly for 
allowing gay marriage), and 3) how the arguments changed participants’ opinions (for example, 
participants were more likely to vote for cell phones being banned in schools and less likely to vote 
for using flavored milk in school lunches after reading all arguments). An iterative agglomerative 
clustering method was developed to cluster the ballot measures into 16 clusters with 3 scenarios 
each based on the three dimensions described above (Figure 26). For each cluster, the three ballot 
measures were randomly assigned to one of three stimuli groups. The three stimuli groups did not 
significantly differ in prior opinion, final opinion, overall log likelihood ratio, proportion of yes votes, 
confidence, reaction time, care rating, knowledge rating, or consideration rating. The three stimuli 
groups were assigned to three stimulation sessions.  
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Figure 26: Sorting of ballot measures based on initial belief, persuasiveness (log likelihood 
ratio), and the first principal component of the knowledge, consideration, and care ratings. Each 
color represents one cluster. The three ballot measures in each cluster were randomly assigned 
to the three stimuli sets.   
 
News Headlines: Participants were shown newspaper headlines and had to judge whether each 
headline was real or fake. When judging whether a headline was real or fake, participants were told 
to consider how likely the event described in the headline actually took place in real life. In each 
trial, a newspaper headline was presented and participants used a digital slider to report their 
response to the question “How likely did this ACTUALLY happen?” (Figure 27). The leftmost point 
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on the slider was labeled “definitely fake” and the rightmost point was labeled “definitely real.” 
Subtle vertical lines were drawn at 25%, 50%, and 75% of the slider track to help orient participants.  
 
Figure 27: Example news headlines and task structure. 
 
Sixty real news headlines were pulled from the Washington Post, the New York Times, Fox 
News, BBC, and NPR and were published between October 2016 and July 2017. Sixty fake 
headlines were pulled from Snopes, an online fact-checking website. The fake headlines had to 
have been published on a fake news site or social media site and had to have been rated “false” by 
Snopes. All but 2 of the 60 fake headlines were published in 2016 or 2017. Each headline was 
assigned a political bias score, ranging from -3 for very liberal (for example, “Mike Pence opposes 
word ‘vice’ on religious grounds, doesn’t want to be called vice president”), to 0 for neutral (“Man 
dressed as clown arrested after police find 11 bodies stuffed in freezers at his home”), to 3 for very 
conservative (“Van full of illegal immigrants caught visiting Arizona voting booths to vote for 
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Clinton”). A separate group of 59 participants rated all 120 news headlines using the digital slider. 
The headlines were sorted into three stimuli sets on the basis of believability (estimated by the 
mean slider position of each headline) and political bias. The real and fake headlines were each 
sorted into 20 groups of 3 headlines each using the same iterative agglomerative clustering method 
that was used to sort the ballot measures (Figure 28). Then, the headlines in each cluster were 
randomly assigned to the three stimuli sets. The headlines in each stimuli set did not significantly 
differ in believability, political bias, response time, or accuracy.  
 
Figure 28: Sorting of real and fake headlines based on plausibility and political bias. Each color 
represents one cluster. The three headlines in each cluster were randomly assigned to the three 
stimuli sets. 
3. Current Flow Modeling 
The current flow modeling pipeline was identical to that used in the first tDCS experiment (see 
section II). 
3. Stimulation Procedure 
Each participant completed three sessions: a LH-bias condition with a left anode and right 
cathode, a RH-bias condition with a right anode and left cathode, and a sham condition which 
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served as a control. The stimulation sessions were completed at the same time of day when 
possible and at least 48 hours apart.  
Participants signed a consent form and read task instructions at the beginning of the first 
session. At the beginning of all sessions, participants reported their baseline opinions of the ballot 
measures using the digital slider. Next, participants were fitted with the electrodes using the exact 
same procedure described in chapter II. This experiment deviated from the first tDCS experiment in 
only two ways: first, the anode was set to +1.5mA and the cathode was set to -1.5mA instead of 
+2mA and -2mA, and, second, participants were stimulated for 35 minutes instead of 20 minutes.  
During stimulation, participants completed 16 trials of the voter ballot task, 16 trials of the 
criminal court task, and 40 trials of the news headlines task. After the third session, participants 
completed an online survey that consisted of questions about motivation (McAuley, Duncan, & 
Tammen, 1989), handedness (Oldfield, 1971), political attitudes and belief superiority (Toner, Leary, 
Asher, & Jongman-Sereno, 2013), dogmatism (Altemeyer, 2002), political attitudes (Pew Research 
Center, Political Polarization in the American Public: Appendix A), and news consumption (adapted 
from Pew Research Center, Americans’ Attitudes about the News Media Deeply Divided along 
Partisan Lines: Appendix A).  
4. Data Analysis 
All analyses were performed in Python using the Pandas, Numpy, Sci-kit learn, and statsmodels 
packages.  
To determine how prior beliefs and evidence affect participants’ belief updates, continuous 
heatmaps were created that denoted participants’ average belief update over the full range of prior 
belief certainties (from completely uncertain to completely certain) and evidence consistency (from 
highly confirmatory to highly disconfirmatory of the prior). The magnitudes of the belief updates 
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were equal to the absolute difference in slider position before vs. after each observation and the 
directions of the update were normalized so that positive values indicated updates toward either 
end of the slider (advances) and negative values indicated updates toward the middle of the slider 
(backtracks). Prior certainties ranged from 0 to 0.5. Evidence consistency was estimated with the log 
likelihood ratios associated with each piece of evidence from the respective pilot experiments. 
Positive values indicated that the evidence was aligned with participants’ prior beliefs and vice 
versa.  Continuous heatmaps were generated by summing Gaussian kernels with heights equal to 
the belief update, x coordinates equal to the prior belief certainty, and y coordinate equal to the 
evidence consistency for all observations. Heatmaps were subtracted from each other to compare 
stimulation conditions.  
Multinomial logistic regression was used to determine the effects of stimulation on the 
frequency of different types of belief updates (advances, backtracks, or no updates) for both the 
criminal court cases and ballot measures. The design matrix for both analyses consisted of the 
following regressors: LH-bias stimulation; RH-bias stimulation; prior belief certainty (continuous), 
evidence inconsistency (continuous); LH*prior certainty; RH*prior certainty; LH*evidence 
inconsistency; RH*evidence inconsistency; LH*prior certainty*evidence inconsistency; RH*prior 
certainty*evidence inconsistency; evidence number; evidence order; degree of handedness 
(continuous); dogmatism score (continuous); self-reported effort (continuous); self-reported skill 
(continuous); belief superiority score (continuous), and political attitude (continuous: more negative, 
more liberal).Continuous regressors were normalized so that they ranged from 0 to 1. Beta values 
were found with Ordinary Least Squares and a Bonferroni correction was applied to correct for 
multiple comparisons (alpha = 0.0023). 
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C. Results 
1. Criminal court case scenarios 
Pilot data:  A pilot study was conducted on a separate group of 48 participants in order to 
characterize the court case scenarios. Each participant provided judgments for all 48 scenarios and 
the evidence order was counterbalanced across participants.  
Participants were given an introduction to a court case and asked to judge whether the 
defendant was guilty or not guilty before seeing any evidence. For this first judgment, most 
participants kept the slider in the middle of the track, but 3 participants consistently moved the 
slider all the way to “definitely not guilty” and 3 participants moved the slider closer toward 
“guilty.”  The persuasiveness of evidence in each court case was estimated by the log likelihood 
ratio (Equation 2) where positive values indicate that participants were more likely to make a 
“guilty” verdict after seeing all the evidence and negative values indicate that participants were 
more likely to make a “not guilty” judgment. The 48 scenarios are sorted from most to least 
persuasive of guilt in Figure 29. Although all of the cases resulted in convictions that were later 
overturned, about half of the cases were associated with greater “guilty” verdicts and about half 
were associated with greater “not guilty” verdicts.  
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Figure 29: Pilot ratings for criminal court case scenarios. Average initial belief, final belief, and 
persuasiveness associated with 48 criminal court case scenarios. Each bar represents the mean 
of 48 participants and error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.  
 
Crime scene evidence was sorted into 22 categories prior to the pilot experiment. For each 
evidence presentation, the log likelihood ratio associated with that piece of evidence was 
computed (using Equation 2) and the log likelihood ratios for each evidence category were 
averaged in order to determine which types of evidence were the most persuasive. We found that 
participants were most strongly persuaded that a defendant was guilty when presented with 
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confessions, matches between physical crime scene evidence and the suspect, and second-hand 
confessions (i.e., when a third party reported that the suspect confessed). Participants were less 
persuaded by connections to the victim and prior criminal records. Physical evidence mismatches, a 
lack of physical evidence, and suspect description mismatches were the most convincing of a 
defendant’s innocence. There was a striking asymmetry in how participants weighed suspects’ 
statements – based off of participants’ ratings, confessions were approximately 13x more indicative 
of guilt than innocence, while claims of innocence were only 1.4x more indicative of innocence than 
guilt.   
 
 
Figure 30: Average log likelihood ratio for each evidence category. Positive values indicate the 
evidence is more likely to occur when a defendant is guilty and negative values indicate that the 
evidence is more likely to occur when a defendant is innocent. 
tDCS data: Participants were presented with evidence from real criminal investigations and were 
asked to judge whether the defendant was guilty or not guilty. For each of the 48 criminal cases, 
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the evidence was presented in one of four orders that differed by presentation sequence (guilty 
evidence last vs. innocent evidence last) and order type (stacked evidence types vs. interleaved 
evidence types). The same pieces of evidence were presented for each court case regardless of 
evidence order. Figure 31 shows participants’ judgments in every trial with the mean judgments for 
each evidence order overlaid in black. On average, participants moved the slider toward “guilty” 
after receiving guilty evidence (represented with orange bars) and closer toward “not guilty” after 
receiving innocent evidence (blue bars). Most participants placed the slider in the middle of the 
track after being introduced to the crime, but before seeing any evidence. However, one participant 
always moved the slider all the way to “not guilty” and one participant moved the slider different 
distances toward “guilty”. Participants’ final judgments varied greatly, which is likely due to the 
strength of each court case’s body of evidence. There was a slight primacy effect for stacked 
evidence orders: after all evidence was presented, the same defendants were judged to be less 
guilty when innocent evidence was presented first than when guilty evidence was presented first 
(0.467 vs. 0.497; sufficient-summary-statistic with nested scenario effects, z=-2.008, p=0.044). There 
was no difference in final beliefs when the evidence types were interleaved (guilty last: 0.471 vs. 
innocent last: 0.478; sufficient-summary-statistic with nested scenario effects, z=-0.491, p=0.624). 
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Figure 31: Beliefs over time for criminal court cases. The evidence for all 48 scenarios was 
presented in 4 different ways, with each evidence order being presented to 6 participants each. 
The evidence orders varied according to order type (stacked or interleaved) and presentation 
sequence (guilty evidence last or innocent evidence last). Bars indicate when guilty (orange) or 
innocent (blue) evidence was presented. Time courses for individual trials are in light gray and 
mean time courses are in black. 
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Figure 32: Beliefs over time according to stimulation condition. The mean time courses for each 
evidence order type under LH-bias stimulation (blue), RH-bias stimulation (purple), or sham 
stimulation (gray). Error bars represent the standard error of participant means.  
Belief trajectories were very similar across the three stimulation conditions for both stacked and 
interleaved presentation orders (Figure 32).  The rationale for using stacked evidence orders was to 
spur the formation of strong beliefs and then introduce inconsistent evidence to create conflict. 
These trials allow for two tests of our framework. First, since uncertainty is high at the beginning of 
each trial as details about the crime emerge, we expected that LH-bias stimulation would be 
associated with greater belief updates relative to sham and RH-bias stimulation for the first three 
pieces of evidence (which either all suggested innocence or all suggested guilt). Second, we 
predicted that the first inconsistent piece of evidence (evidence 4) would produce greater belief 
backtracks in the RH-bias stimulation condition compared to LH-bias and sham stimulation. To test 
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these predictions, we first reversed the slider position coding of trials in which guilty evidence was 
presented last so that, for all stacked trials, increases in slider position indicated greater agreement 
with initial evidence. Figure 33 shows the changes in beliefs for the first three pieces of evidence 
relative to the prior belief for LH-bias stimulation (blue), sham stimulation (gray), and RH-bias 
stimulation (purple). Contrary to predictions, LH-bias stimulation was associated with numerically 
smaller belief updates in the direction of the evidence compared to RH-bias stimulation and sham, 
although none of these differences reached significance using the sufficient-summary-statistic with 
nested scenario effects. In line with predictions, RH-bias stimulation was associated with greater 
backtracks and LH-bias stimulation was associated with smaller backtracks compared to sham for 
the 4th piece of evidence, however, these differences were also not significant.  
 
Figure 33: Belief changes in trials with stacked evidence. Left: Changes in slider position for the 
first three pieces of evidence relative to the slider position for the introduction. Right: Changes 
in slider position for the last three pieces of evidence relative to the slider position for third 
piece of evidence. Circles indicate mean slider positions for each evidence number and each 
condition (blue: LH-bias, gray: sham, purple: RH-bias). Greater values indicate slider positions 
that are closer to the initial evidence type. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals of 
scenario means.  
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The previous analysis took advantage of the structure of the evidence presentation orders, but 
made assumptions about belief strength and the presence of belief-evidence conflicts. As a more 
direct test of our hypotheses, we used data from all evidence presentations and characterized how 
stimulation influenced belief updating across the full spectrum of prior belief certainties and 
evidence consistencies. Our central prediction concerned belief updating when evidence 
disconfirmed certain beliefs: we predicted that LH-bias stimulation would be associated with less 
backtracking compared to sham stimulation since backtracking increases uncertainty, and that RH-
bias stimulation would be associated with more backtracking compared to sham since backtracking 
reduces conflict. Consistent with predictions, we found that RH-stimulation was associated with 
greater backtracking when evidence disconfirmed strong prior beliefs (approximately, when 
certainty > 0.4) compared to both sham stimulation and LH-bias stimulation.   
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Figure 34: Normalized belief updates according to prior certainty and evidence consistency for 
criminal court cases. Areas in red denote backtracks in beliefs (updates toward the middle of 
the slider) and areas in blue denote advances in beliefs (updates toward either end of the 
slider). Evidence consistency is estimated from the log likelihood ratios computed from the pilot 
experiment.    
 
To examine the effects of additional factors on belief updating, we ran a multinomial logistic 
regression analysis.  First, we classified all observations into three belief update types: 1) backtracks, 
defined as movements toward the middle of the slider track, (n=2112), 2) advances, defined as 
movements toward either end of the track (n=3314), and 3) non-updates, in which the slider was not 
moved at all (n=1774). The design matrix included interactions for stimulation condition, prior belief 
certainty, and evidence consistency, as well as factors of non-interest including evidence order, 
evidence number, and participant factors (handedness, self-reported effort, self-reported skill, belief 
  88 
superiority, dogmatism, and political attitude). Cortical current density was not included in the 
model due to the poor interpretability of multiple 4-way interactions. Multinomial logistic regression 
was used to determine the marginal influence of each factor on the likelihood of each update type. 
The results of the analysis are presented in Figure 35, and can be interpreted as, for example, 
“disconfirmatory evidence makes it more likely that an update will be a backtrack, less likely that an 
update will be an advance, and does not change the likelihood of keeping the slider in place.” 
Parameters that are significantly different from zero after controlling for multiple comparisons are 
outlined in black.  
As expected, inconsistent evidence (that went against participants’ prior beliefs) increased the 
likelihood of backtracks and decreased the likelihood of advances. Certain prior beliefs were 
associated with a lower likelihood of advancing the slider and a greater likelihood of backtracking 
the slider or keeping it in place. Conflict was associated with fewer backtracks. Although this seems 
unintuitive, it makes sense considering that conflict is defined as the interaction between evidence 
consistency and prior certainty. There are more backtracks as evidence is more disconfirmatory and 
as prior certainty increases, but comparatively fewer backtracks when both occur together. There 
was no effect of stimulation on belief update type, and no significant interactions between 
stimulation, evidence consistency, and prior certainty on belief updating.  
Some of the participant measures were significant, including belief superiority, self-reported 
effort on the task, political conservatism, right-handedness, and dogmatism.  Of note, higher belief 
superiority and political conservatism (or in this sample, less political liberalism) were associated 
with fewer backtracks. Greater dogmatism was associated with more advances, while self-reports of 
greater effort on the task and more extreme right-handedness was associated with fewer advances. 
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Figure 35: Marginal effects of multinomial logistic regression of update types for the criminal 
court cases. Marginal effects of each factor on the likelihood that a given observation is a 
backtrack (orange), advance (blue), or no update (gray). Positive and negative marginal effects 
indicate that the factor increases and decreases the likelihood of the class type, respectively. 
Significant effects are outlined in black (Bonferroni correction for 19 comparisons, t>3.01, 
p<0.0026).  
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Figure 36: Predictions of the multinomial regression analysis for court cases. Distributions of 
actual normalized updates for predicted backtracks (orange), advances (blue), and non-updates 
(gray). True advances are defined as positive normalized updates and true backtracks are 
defined as negative normalized updates.   
2. Ballot Measure Scenarios 
Pilot data: Like the criminal court cases, the ballot measures were also characterized by an 
independent group of 48 participants. Each participant provided judgments for all 48 scenarios and 
the evidence order was counterbalanced across participants.  
As in the court case pilot study, participants were given an introduction to the ballot measure 
and asked to report their initial opinion before seeing any arguments. Participants were also asked 
how much they knew about the topic, how much they cared about it, and how much they had 
considered the issue beforehand. Participants’ initial beliefs varied greatly from topic to topic. In 
Figure 37, ballot measures are sorted form strongest initial “yes” votes to strongest initial “no” 
votes.  
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Figure 37: Pilot ratings for ballot measures. Average initial belief, final belief, and 
persuasiveness associated with 48 ballot measures. Each bar represents the mean of 48 
participants and error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.  
tDCS data: Participants were presented with pro and con arguments for hypothetical ballot 
measures and were asked to vote yes or no on the measure. Each of the 48 ballot measures were 
paired with two arguments in favor of the measure and two arguments in opposition to it and the 
argument orders differed according to which argument was presented last and whether the 
argument types were stacked or interleaved. The same arguments were presented for each ballot 
measure regardless of evidence order. Participants’ opinions over the course of every trial are 
presented in Figure 38, with the mean judgments for each evidence order overlaid in black. 
Participants generally moved the slider toward “yes” after reading a pro argument (represented 
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with orange bars) and closer toward “no” after reading con arguments (blue bars). There are several 
striking differences between the individual trials in the ballot measures task vs. the criminal cases 
task. First, there is much more variation in participants’ prior beliefs for the ballot measures than for 
the criminal cases. Second, as evinced by the darker lines at the “yes” and “no” boundaries, 
participants occasionally moved the slider all the way to one end of the slider and kept it there 
throughout all of the argument presentations.    
 
Figure 38: Beliefs over time for ballot measures. The arguments for all 48 scenarios were 
presented in 4 different orders, with each evidence order being presented to 6 participants 
each. The evidence orders varied according to order type (stacked or interleaved) and 
presentation sequence (pro argument last or con argument last). Bars indicate when pro 
(orange) or con (blue) arguments were presented. Time courses for individual trials are in light 
gray and mean time courses are in black. 
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To illustrate how greatly baseline beliefs differ across different ballot measures, belief ratings for 
each ballot measure were averaged to create a mean belief trajectory for each ballot measure and 
each evidence presentation order (Figure 39). Since ballot measures were associated with a wide 
range of baseline beliefs, subsequent analyses used baseline subtracted slider positions (by 
subtracting the slider position for the introductory text) and nested statsistical tests were performed 
across ballot measures rather than across participants.  
 
Figure 39: Average beliefs over time for each ballot measure. Each light gray line represents the 
average belief time course for one ballot measure. The means were computed across 6 
participants for each evidence order.   
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Figure 40: Beliefs on ballot measures in each stimulation condition. The mean time courses for 
each evidence order type under LH-bias stimulation (blue), RH-bias stimulation (purple), or sham 
stimulation (gray). Error bars represent the standard error of participant means.  
 
Average belief trajectories for the three stimulation conditions are presented in Figure 40. As 
before, we examined how tDCS influenced belief updating across the full spectrum of prior belief 
certainties and evidence consistencies. Again, we predicted to see the largest condition differences 
when evidence disconfirmed certain beliefs, such that LH-bias stimulation would lead to less 
backtracking relative to sham and RH-bias stimulation would lead to greater backtracking relative to 
sham. We found that RH-bias stimulation was generally associated with greater backtracking when 
evidence disconfirmed strong prior beliefs compared to both sham stimulation and LH-bias 
stimulation (Figure 41).   
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Figure 41: Normalized belief updates according to prior certainty and evidence consistency for 
ballot measures. Areas in red denote backtracks in beliefs (updates toward the middle of the 
slider) and areas in blue denote advances in beliefs (updates toward either end of the slider). 
Evidence consistency is estimated from the log likelihood ratios computed from the pilot 
experiment.  
 
Finally, we used multinomial logistic regression to examine which factors were associated with 
backtracks, advances, and no belief updates. All observations were classified as backtracks 
(n=1437), advances (n=1443), or non-updates (n=1895). The design matrix used in the criminal 
court case analysis was used in this analysis as well.  Multinomial logistic regression was used to 
determine the marginal influence of each factor on the likelihood of each update type (Figure 42). 
Parameters that are significantly different from zero after controlling for multiple comparisons are 
outlined in black.  
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Figure 42: Marginal effects of multinomial logistic regression of update types for the ballot 
measures. Marginal effects of each factor on the likelihood that a given observation is a 
backtrack (orange), advance (blue), or no update (gray). Positive and negative marginal effects 
indicate that the factor increases and decreases the likelihood of the class type, respectively. 
Significant effects are outlined in black (Bonferroni correction for 21 comparisons, t>3.01, 
p<0.0026).  
 
As expected, disconfirmatory arguments (that went against participants’ prior beliefs) increased 
the likelihood of backtracks and decreased the likelihood of advances. Certain prior beliefs were 
associated with a lower likelihood of moving the slider (either backtracking or advancing) and a 
greater likelihood of keeping the slider in place. Conflict (defined as the interaction between prior 
certainty and disconfirmatory evidence) was associated with a greater likelihood of advance.  
The three-way interaction between RH-bias stimulation, prior belief certainty, and evidence 
disconfirmation (RH-bias*conflict) was associated with a lower likelihood of advance, meaning that 
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participants were less likely to adopt more extreme beliefs in the face of conflict under RH-bias 
stimulation compared to sham stimulation. Similar to the court case analysis, several participant 
factors influence belief update type, including self-reported effort, political conservatism, belief 
superiority, self-reported skill, and dogmatism.   
 
Figure 43: Predictions of the multinomial regression analysis for ballot measures.  
3. News Headlines 
In each stimulation session, participants were shown 40 news headlines, 20 of which were real 
and 20 of which were fake, and had to judge the likelihood that each headline was real.  We 
predicted that RH-bias stimulation would make participants more skeptical of headlines in general. 
In order to compute hit rates and false alarm rates, participants’ plausibility judgments were 
binarized such that likelihoods < 0.5 were considered “fake” judgments and likelihoods > 0.5 were 
considered “real” judgments. Likelihoods exactly equal to 0.5 were excluded from the analysis and 
made up 1.2% of all responses. Participants’ discrimination of real vs. fake headlines (d’) and 
response criterion (c) were computed for each stimulation condition (Figure 44 and Figure 45). 
Compared to LH-bias stimulation and sham, RH-stimulation was associated with poorer 
discrimination of real vs. fake headlines (LH>RH Wilcoxon signed-rank test, statistic=74.5, p=0.03, 
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RH>SH Wilcoxon signed-rank test, statistic=68.0, p=0.03). However, there was no significant 
difference in response criterion between LH-bias and RH-bias stimulation, although participants 
were slightly more conservative under RH-bias stimulation (LH>RH Wilcoxon signed-rank test, 
statistic=139.0, p=0.75, RH>SH Wilcoxon signed-rank test, statistic=111.5, p=0.27).  
 
Figure 44: Condition differences in discrimination ability (d’). D’ values of 0.5 indicate chance 
performance and higher values represent better discrimination.  
 
Figure 45: Condition differences in response criterion. Positive values correspond to 
conservative criteria and negative values correspond to liberal criteria.  
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Participants’ poorer discrimination of real vs. fake headlines under RH-bias stimulation 
compared to sham is driven by lower hit rates under RH-bias stimulation (Figure 46; RH>SH 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test, statistic=56.5, p=0.04). There was no difference in false alarm rates 
under RH-stimulation (RH>SH Wilcoxon signed-rank test, statistic=72.5, p=0.22).  
 
Figure 46: Condition differences in hit rates and false alarm rates. 
 
Multiple linear regression was used to examine the influence of stimulation on plausibility 
ratings while accounting for additional factors (Figure 47). Contrary to predictions, RH-bias 
stimulation intensity was associated with greater plausibility ratings (beta: 0.09 ± 0.04, t=2.32, 
p=0.02), but the relationship was not significant after correcting for multiple comparisons. 
Consistency between the bias of the headline and participants’ political leanings was associated 
with greater plausibility ratings. Finally, we found that people who reported trying harder rated 
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headlines as less plausible and participants who were more strongly right-handed rated the 
headlines as more plausible.  
 
Figure 47: Linear regression results for headline plausibility. Values in black are significant after 
correcting for 17 comparisons with a Bonferroni correction (t>2.98, p<0.003). 
 
We applied the same multiple regression model to participants’ certainty ratings. In line with our 
framework, we expected LH-bias stimulation to be associated with more certainty and RH-bias 
stimulation to be associated with less certainty. We found that RH-bias stimulation intensity was 
associated with less certain plausibility ratings (beta: -0.05 ± 0.02, t=-2.68, p=0.07), but the 
comparison did not survive the multiple comparisons correction. Only participant-related factors 
influenced the certainty associated with participants’ plausibility ratings: greater dogmatism and 
greater trust in national news organizations were associated with less certain ratings while right-
handedness, self-reported effort, greater frequency of news consumption, and greater frequency of 
news source-checking were associated with greater certainty ratings.  
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Figure 48: Linear regression results for headline rating certainty. Values in black are significant 
after correcting for 17 comparisons with a Bonferroni correction (t>2.98, p<0.003). 
 
D. Discussion 
The primary goal of this experiment was to determine how tDCS affected participants’ belief 
updating under belief-evidence conflicts. In order to create more salient belief-evidence conflicts, 
we used scenarios that have more real-world applicability and that are naturally associated with 
stronger prior opinions. The ballot measures task in particular was designed to take advantage of 
the participants’ pre-formed beliefs. Consistent with our predictions, the heatmap analyses 
provided evidence that RH-bias stimulation was associated with greater belief backtracks when 
evidence disconfirmed strong beliefs compared to sham and LH-bias stimulation in both the court 
case and ballot measure tasks (Figure 34 and Figure 41). A likely reason for observing greater 
belief-evidence conflict backtracks under RH-bias stimulation in this experiment but not the first 
tDCS experiment is that the state guessing task in the first experiment did not induce salient 
conflicts when disconfirmatory evidence was observed, whereas these tasks did. 
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In the multinomial regression analysis for the ballot measures, we found that participants were 
less likely to adopt more extreme beliefs when faced with conflicting arguments in the RH-bias 
stimulation condition. Previous research has shown that people with strong beliefs tend to 
paradoxically strengthen their belief when presented with evidence that contradicts it, which is likely 
due to discounting evidence that disconfirms strong beliefs and favoring evidence that confirms 
them (McKenzie, Lee, & Chen, 2002; Taber, Cann, Kucsova, 2009; Taber & Lodge, 2006, Redlawsk, 
2002). The results from this experiment suggest that RH-bias stimulation abolishes, or at least 
mitigates, this tendency, since participants under RH-bias stimulation were less likely to advance 
their beliefs when they observed conflicting arguments in the ballot measure task.  
We also found that RH-bias stimulation was associated with poorer discrimination between the 
real and fake headlines compared to sham stimulation, which was driven by lower hit rates. This 
suggests that RH-bias stimulation made participants less willing to rate headlines as being plausible, 
but did not change their evaluation of less plausible headlines. It is possible that these results can 
be explained by participants making less certain judgments under RH-bias stimulation, a trend that 
is reflected in the regression analysis but that did not reach significance after controlling for multiple 
comparisons. Since the average headline rating was slightly implausible (0.45 on a scale from 0 to 
1), slight reductions in certainty would make slightly plausible headlines slightly implausible and 
implausible headlines slightly less implausible. Since we binarized participants judgments by 
considering ratings > 0.5 as “real” judgments and ratings < 0.5 as “fake” judgments, this would 
result in fewer “real” judgments for plausible headlines but would not affect the proportion of 
“fake” judgments for implausible headlines, thus resulting in a lower hit rate but normal false alarm 
rate. 
Some differences in behavior were explained by individual difference measures. Most notably, 
we found that political conservatism was associated with greater backtracking and fewer non-
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updates in both the court case and ballot measure tasks. Since all 24 participants in this experiment 
leaned liberal, these results can be interpreted as participants with more moderate or mixed 
political views are more likely to backtrack on their beliefs than those with more extreme or more 
consistent liberal leanings. In a similar vein, we found that higher ratings of dogmatism were 
associated with more advances in the court case task. 
The results of this experiment are generally in line with our predictions that RH-bias should be 
associated with greater backtracking when evidence conflicts strong beliefs and associated with 
establishing a higher threshold for accepting events to be real.
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IV. Experiment 3: Hemispheric asymmetry during uncertainty and conflict 
A. Rationale 
As discussed previously, neuroimaging studies on healthy participants provide less support for 
hemispheric asymmetry in reasoning than do patient studies. Relying on existing neuroimaging 
studies to test our predictions of hemispheric asymmetry has several drawbacks. First, existing 
neuroimaging studies rarely, if ever, directly examine hemispheric asymmetry by comparing activity 
in the right and left hemispheres. Instead, one must use thresholded statistical maps to make 
inferences about hemispheric asymmetry, and doing so can lead to misleading conclusions. For 
example, a contrast in which values are just above the threshold in one hemisphere and just 
subthreshold in the contralateral hemisphere may make a process appear lateralized, even in the 
absence of significant differences in activity. In other cases, there may be activation clusters in both 
hemispheres, but the magnitudes of activity differ significantly. Second, most studies do not use 
contrasts that attempt to isolate the processes that we make predictions about, namely contrasts 
involving reducing uncertainty and reducing conflict. This limits our ability to use existing studies to 
test the predictions of our framework. Third, asymmetric processing may not produce asymmetric 
BOLD activity. Different neural network architectures may lead to different processing 
characteristics which in turn lead to different behavioral outcomes, but these functional asymmetries 
may go undetected with traditional neuroimaging approaches that examine BOLD activity profiles.  
To address the first problem, we previously conducted a series of meta-analyses that directly 
compared right vs. left hemisphere activity across groups of contrasts in the existing reasoning 
literature. We grouped contrasts that were similar and that we expected to be more left- or right-
lateralized. Much like the reasoning neuroimaging literature on the whole, the results were mixed. 
Some contrasts produced lateralized results in accordance with our predictions, but others 
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produced bilateral results. Although our meta-analyses attempted to overcome the first problem by 
directly comparing left vs. right hemisphere activity, it was ill-suited to overcome the second 
problem because the contrasts that made up each meta-analysis were not designed to isolate the 
processes that we made predictions about. Due to the types of contrasts that fed into each meta-
analysis, the results may have been driven more by ancillary processing demands (e.g., trial 
difficulty, visual vs. verbal processing, or working memory load) than the reasoning processes that 
we care about. 
In order to better test our predictions about hemispheric asymmetry in reasoning, we ran an 
fMRI study that was designed to overcome both the first and second problems. Participants in the 
experiment completed the same state-guessing task described in Chapter 2. In the task, 
participants make inferences as evidence is presented sequentially. Due to the probabilistic nature 
of the task, participants’ inferences are uncertain and their certainty levels change throughout each 
trial. Additionally, participants occasionally receive evidence that conflicts their current guess. This 
task allowed us to identify brain regions that are recruited when uncertainty is high or when conflict 
arises, which we predicted to be associated with greater left- and right-hemisphere activity, 
respectively. Furthermore, we directly tested our predictions by comparing activity in homologous 
regions in the left and right hemisphere for contrasts that we predict to have asymmetric activity.  
Like other fMRI studies, this experiment does not address the third problem since differences in 
cognitive processing may not be associated with differences in BOLD activity. However, 
establishing asymmetry in contrasts that we predict to be asymmetric provides some evidence that 
neural processing in the left and right hemispheres is not identical and that the hemispheres play 
different roles in reasoning.  
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B. Methods 
1. Participants 
37 individuals (25 females, age mean: 21 years, age range: 18 to 37 years) participated in the 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) experiment. Participants were recruited from an 
online participant pool, through recruitment emails sent to undergraduate mailing lists, and through 
word of mouth. All participants had to pass a behavioral prescreen before being scanned. In the 
prescreen, participants filled out eligibility forms for fMRI, TMS, and tDCS and completed two 
behavioral tasks: a probabilistic inference task (described in Chapter 2) and a recognition memory 
task for a separate experiment. Participants who failed to shift their decision criteria in the memory 
task, failed to discriminate studied vs. unstudied items in the memory test above chance, or failed 
to move the slider in at least 50% of the first 6 observations in the probabilistic inference task were 
excluded from participating in the fMRI experiment. Participants who were deemed unsafe or 
ineligible to participate in the fMRI, TMS, or tDCS experiments were also excluded. Eligibility 
criteria included 1) no metal in the body other than dental work, 2) no history of epilepsy, stroke, or 
brain damage, 3) no pacemaker or brain stimulator, 4) no dredlocks or irritation on the scalp near 
the electrode sites, and 5) not currently pregnant. Participants were paid $20 per hour for their 
participation in the experiment.   
One participant withdrew from the fMRI experiment before the functional scans were collected 
due to feelings of claustrophobia.  The dataset consisted of data from the remaining 36 
participants.   
2. Task 
The same probabilistic inference task described in Chapter 2 was used in the fMRI experiment. 
Briefly, participants were told that the computer randomly selected one of two U.S. states and their 
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goal was to guess which state was selected based on the ethnicities of people who live in the 
selected state. Participants observed residents’ ethnicities one at a time for 2.8 seconds (7 TRs) each 
and reported their current guess about which state was selected with a continuous digital slider. 
Participants used the left and right buttons of an MRI-compatible button box to move the slider 
leftward and rightward. Unlike the tDCS experiment, participants were not given the option to stop 
collecting evidence in the fMRI experiment. Ten residents were presented in every trial and 
participants were required to view all ten. Participants also did not report their final guess or their 
confidence at the end of each trial. To encourage participants to use the slider thoughtfully, 
bonuses were awarded based on the position of the slider (described in more detail in Chapter 2).  
3. Procedure 
At the beginning of every scanning session, participants signed the consent form, read task 
instructions, completed a practice session, and changed into hospital scrubs. After verifying that 
participants removed all metal, they were assisted into the scanner. Participants were instructed to 
remain as still as possible during each scan and were given neck pads to help keep their heads still. 
Each fMRI session consisted of 15 scans, which were collected in the following order: 1 localizer 
scan, 1 gradient echo field map, 1 t2-weighted anatomical scan, 5 functional localizer scans (300 
TRs), 3 functional scans for the state guessing task (1060 TRs each), 1 t1-weighted anatomical scan, 
and 2 functional scans for a memory task. Each scanning session took 1.25-1.5 hours.  
The state guessing functional scans resembled a slow-event related design. Each of the ten 
trials per functional run were separated by 12 seconds (30 TRs). Within each trial, the 10 ethnicities 
were presented continuously for 2.8 seconds each, for a total of 28 seconds. The scans were set up 
this way to allow for analysis of the temporal dynamics of each trial in isolation.   
  108 
4. Data Acquisition 
MRI data was acquired at the Brain Imaging Center at the University of California, Santa Barbara 
on a Siemens 3T Prisma scanner with a 64-channel phased-array head coil. Blood Oxygenated Level 
Dependent (BOLD) contrasts were measured with a gradient-echo echoplanar imaging sequence 
(400ms repetition time (TR); 35ms echo time (TE); 52 degree flip angle (FA)). Each volume consisted 
of 48 slices acquired parallel to the AC-PC plane that covered the whole brain (multi-band 
acceleration factor of 8, interleaved acquisition; 3 mm slice thickness; 3 x 3 mm in-plane resolution; 
192mm field of view (FOV); 64 x 64 matrix). The T1-weighted anatomical scan was collected 
sagittally with an anterior-to-posterior phase encoding direction (0.94mm slice thickness, MPRAGE, 
2500ms TR; 2.22ms TE; 7 degree FA; 241 mm FOV). The T2-weighted anatomical scan was also 
collected sagittally with an anterior-to-posterior phase encoding direction (0.94mm slice thickness, 
MPRAGE, 3200ms TR; 566ms TE; 241 mm FOV).  
5. Data Processing 
Preprocessing and statistical analyses were carried out with the fMRI Expert Analysis Tool 
(FEAT, version 5.0.10), which is part of the FMRIB software Library (FSL, http://fsl.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl). 
The data in each functional run were filtered with 100s high-pass filter, motion corrected with 
MCFLIRT, and spatially smoothed with a 5mm full-width at half-maximum kernel. BET (Brain 
Extraction Tool) was used to remove non-brain voxels, field map unwarping was applied to account 
for inhomogeneity in the magnetic field, and FILM pre-whitening was used to reduce the 
autocorrelation in the data. The functional images were registered to brain-extracted T1 anatomical 
scans using the linear boundary-based registration (BBR) algorithm. The anatomical images were 
registered to the standard MNI-152 2mm brain template using an affine transformation with 12 
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degrees of freedom using FLIRT, followed by a nonlinear transformation with a 10mm warp 
resolution using FNIRT.  
6. Univariate Data Analysis 
The design matrix for the general linear model consisted of regressors for belief certainty, 
belief-evidence conflict, belief updates, and evidence expectedness, as well as boxcar regressors 
for the different TR types (Table 1). Evidence strength was operationalized as the absolute value of 
the log likelihood ratio: 
 
Equation 3: Estimate of evidence strength. Higher values are indicative of stronger evidence. 
The likelihood estimates were taken from participants’ estimates of state demographics. The 
“guessed state” was defined as the state that the slider was closest to in the previous TR. Log 
likelihood ratios greater than 0 were considered confirmatory evidence and log likelihood ratios less 
than 0 were considered disconfirmatory evidence.  
Evidence expectedness captured how expected the ethnicity evidence was based on 
participants’ state hypotheses and demographic estimates: 
 
Equation 4: Estimate of evidence expectedness. 
Table 1: Regressors in fMRI analysis.  
Regressor Type Demean Description 
prior certainty continuous yes certainty at previous TR 
belief update: advance continuous no magnitude of update toward slider 
ends 
belief update: backtrack continuous no magnitude of update toward slider 
middle 
disconfirmatory evidence 
(DE) 
continuous no strength of evidence (absLLR) that 
conflicted prior belief 
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confirmatory evidence 
(CE) 
continuous no strength of evidence (absLLR) that 
was consistent with prior belief 
DE * prior certainty continuous no interaction of conflicting evidence 
and prior certainty regressors 
CE * prior certainty continuous no interaction of supporting evidence 
and prior certainty regressors 
evidence expectedness continuous yes bayesian estimate of expectedness 
of ethnicity: P(ethnicity) 
button press boxcar no presence of button press 
resident presentation boxcar no presentation of resident 
introduction presentation boxcar no presentation of state options  
new evidence boxcar no TRs when new resident was 
presented 
absLLR: absolute log likelihood ratio, abs(log( P(ethnicity|state) / P(ethnicity|~state))) 
Temporal derivatives and six standard motion parameters were added to the model for a total 
of 30 regressors. Regressors were convolved with a Gamma hemodynamic response function (HRF) 
with 0s phase, 3s standard deviation, and 6s lag.  
A first-level analysis was carried out on every participant and every run. Within each participant, 
parameter estimates were averaged across runs with a standard-weighted fixed-effects model. 
Participants’ parameter estimates were averaged to produce group-level maps for every contrast 
using a mixed effects model (FLAME 1 in FEAT). At every level, multiple comparisons were 
corrected for by applying an initial z-threshold of 2.3 and a cluster threshold of 0.05.  
7. Hemispheric asymmetry analysis 
A hemispheric asymmetry analysis was conducted to directly test for functional asymmetries 
between homologous regions in the left and right frontal lobes for contrasts that were predicted to 
produce asymmetric activations. Anatomical regions consisted of all of the prefrontal structures in 
the Harvard-Oxford cortical atlas and included the frontal pole (FP), superior frontal gyrus (SFG), 
middle frontal gyrus (MFG), inferior frontal gyrus pars triangularis (IFGpt), and inferior frontal gyrus 
pars opercularis (IFGpo). Mid-level contrast of parameter estimates (cope) maps were masked with 
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each of the anatomical ROIs and the average value within each mask was computed for the left and 
right hemispheres. A repeated-measures t-test was used to test for differences between left vs. right 
hemisphere activity for each contrast and each anatomical region. The analysis consisted of 45 
comparisons (5 anatomical regions x 9 contrasts). A Bonferroni correction was applied to account 
for multiple comparisons. 
C. Results 
1. Contrasts with predicted left-lateralized frontal activity 
As before, certainty was operationalized as the distance away from the middle of the slider 
track, and ranged from 0 (completely uncertain) to 0.5 (completely certain). We predicted that 
neural activity in left frontal areas would be commensurate with uncertainty at the beginning of each 
TR, such that greater uncertainty would be associated with greater left frontal activity. Many brain 
regions were more active with increasing uncertainty, including the left middle frontal gyrus (MFG), 
medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), occipital cortex (OCC), left motor 
and sensory cortices, bilateral insula, left posterior parietal cortex (PPC), and basal ganglia.  Only 
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the right sensory cortex was associated with greater activity as certainty increased (Figure 49). 
 
Figure 49: Contrasts with predicted left-lateralized frontal activity. Maps are thresholded at 
z=2.3. 
 
A second contrast examined relationships between brain activity and evidence expectedness. 
For each observation, the expectedness of the resident’s ethnicity, P(ethnicity), was calculated using 
participants’ demographic estimates and their prior beliefs that each state was selected (as 
indicated by their slider position at the previous TR). We predicted that unexpected ethnicities 
would be associated with left frontal activity, since they would introduce uncertainty. We found that 
unexpected ethnicities were associated with greater activity in the left superior, middle, and inferior 
frontal gyri, left insula, left mPFC, and bilateral occipital cortex, while expected ethnicities were 
associated with greater activity in the bilateral supramarginal and angular gyri.  
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Finally, since we propose that left-lateralized networks are driven toward reducing uncertainty, 
we predicted that belief advances (in which the slider is moved toward either end of the track) 
would be associated with left-lateralized activations because they reduce uncertainty. We found 
that, compared to all button presses, belief advances were only associated with greater activity in 
left motor and sensory regions, the posterior cingulate cortex, dorsomedial cortex, and right 
caudate. 
2. Contrasts with predicted right-lateralized frontal activity 
Contrasts the captured conflicts between beliefs and evidence were predicted to have greater 
right vs. left frontal activity. The first contrast identified brain areas that were preferentially active 
during the presentation of confirmatory or disconfirmatory evidence. Confirmatory evidence 
consisted of ethnicities that were more prevalent in the guessed state (closer to the slider) than the 
rejected state (farther from the slider) based on the participants’ estimates of state demographics. 
Similarly, disconfirmatory evidence consisted of ethnicities that were more prevalent in the rejected 
state than the guessed state. Evidence strength increased as the discrepancy between ethnicity 
estimates in the guessed and rejected states increased.  No brain regions became significantly 
more active as the strength of disconfirmatory evidence increased nor as the strength of 
confirmatory evidence increased.  
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Figure 50: Contrasts with predicted right-lateralized frontal activity. Maps are thresholded at 
z=2.3. 
 
One tenet of the hemispheric asymmetry framework is that right frontal neural networks are 
recruited when evidence disconfirms strong prior beliefs. To identify brain regions that are recruited 
when evidence conflicts strong beliefs, a second contrast was carried out that examined the 
interaction between disconfirmatory evidence and prior belief certainty. The bilateral insula, 
bilateral anterior cingulate cortices (ACC), right IFG, bilateral lingual gyri, and bilateral thalami were 
more active as belief-evidence conflict increased. Contrasting strong belief-evidence conflicts 
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(disconfirmatory evidence x prior certainty) vs. strong belief-evidence argreements (confirmatory 
evidence x prior certainty) resulted in greater activations in the bilateral ACC and right thalamus.  
Finally, we proposed that right frontal networks may play a funtional role in reversing beliefs 
that are no longer consistent with the evidence. To test this hypothesis, all slider movements were 
categorized as either an advance, in which the slider was moved closer to either end of the track, or 
a backtrack, in which the slider was moved closer to the middle of the track. A contrast was carried 
out that compared the magnitude of backtracks vs. the magnitude of advances. The left motor 
cortex, bilateral lingual gyri, and bilateral insula were more active with greater advances than 
greater backtracks. The right IFG, bilateral SFG, right supramarginal gryus, and right posterior 
parietal cortex (PPC) were more active with greater backtracks than greater advances. Similarly the 
right anterior insula, right IFG, and right MFG are more active during belief backtracks compared to 
button presses.   
3. Hemispheric asymmetry analysis  
In order to directly test which hemisphere had greater activations in contrasts that we expected 
to be more right-lateralized or left-lateralized, we ran multiple repeated-measures t-tests that 
compared activations in left and right frontal anatomical regions for four contrasts with predicted 
left-lateralized activity and five contrasts with predicted right-lateralized activity. The five frontal 
ROIs were extracted from the Harvard-Oxford atlas and included the frontal pole (FP), superior 
frontal gryus (SFG), middle frontal gyrus (MFG), inferior frontal gyrus pars triangularis (IFGpt), and 
inferior frontal gyrus pars opercularis (IFGpo). We expected that contrasts for uncertainty, 
unexpected evidence, and belief advances would be associated with greater left frontal activity, and 
found that 15 out of 20 comparisons were associated with greater left vs. right activity. Both of the 
inferior frontal gyri ROIs were associated with greater right hemisphere activity for the uncertainty 
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contrast and advance > button press contrast. All frontal ROIs were associated with significantly 
greater activity in the left vs. right homologues for the unexpected evidence contrast after applying 
a Bonferroni correction to correct for multiple comparisons.  
 
Figure 51: T-values from repeated-measures t-tests comparing average activation in left vs. 
right anatomical regions for each contrast. Anatomical regions include the frontal pole (FP), 
superior frontal gyrus (SFG), middle frontal gyrus (MFG), inferior frontal gyrus pars triangularis 
(IFGpt), and inferior frontal gyrus pars opercularis (IFGpo). Negative values (purple) indicate 
more right-lateralized activity and positive values (blue) indicate left-lateralized activity. Values 
in bold are statistically significant after accounting for 45 comparisons (p<0.0011). Note: the 
advance > backtrack contrast and the backtrack > advance contrast are opposite contrasts, so 
the lateralization values are symmetric.  
 
Five contrasts, all of which involved disconfirmatory evidence or belief backtracks, were 
predicted to be associated with more right-lateralized activity. Of the 25 comparisons, 17 were 
associated with greater activations in the right hemisphere. Only the inferior frontal gyrus pars 
triangularis was associated with significant right-lateralized activity for the two backtrack contrasts 
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after correcting for multiple comparisons. Opposite of predictions, the disconfirmatory > 
confirmatory evidence contrast was associated with greater activity in the left vs. right hemisphere in 
each anatomical region, although none of the comparisons reached significance.  
27 out of the 40 predictions were in the predicted direction, which is significantly above chance 
(binomial test: z=2.05, p=0.02; note: the pair of advance/backtrack contrasts were counted as one 
set of predictions since it is the same contrast). If the disconfirmatory > confirmatory evidence 
contrast is excluded (since it involves disconfirmatory evidence irrespective of prior beliefs and our 
predictions specifically regard disconfirmatory evidence and strong prior beliefs), 27 of 35 
comparisons are in the predicted direction (binomial test, z=3.04, p<0.001).  
E. Discussion 
1. Summary of results 
The goal of this study was to use fMRI to test our predictions that the left hemisphere plays a 
dominant role in reducing uncertainty and the right hemisphere plays a dominant role in resolving 
conflict. We compared activity in left vs. right frontal anatomical regions for contrasts that we 
expected to be more left- or right-lateralized. On the whole, the fMRI results were consistent with 
our predictions. We found that the contrasts that involved heightened uncertainty or the reduction 
of uncertainty were largely associated with greater activity in left frontal areas compared to right 
frontal areas. Only the inferior frontal gyrus was associated with greater right hemisphere activity for 
the uncertainty and advance > button press contrasts. Likewise, we found that the contrasts that 
involved conflict or belief backtracking were associated with greater activity in the right vs. left 
hemisphere in most frontal anatomical regions. Not all of the differences were significant after 
correcting for multiple comparisons, but all of the comparisons that were significant were consistent 
with our predictions.  
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2. Conflicting vs. disconfirmatory evidence 
The fMRI results highlight the difference between processing disconfirmatory evidence and 
conflicting evidence. Here, we define disconfirmatory evidence as all evidence that provides more 
support for the alternative hypothesis than the current hypothesis. When participants only have a 
weak hunch about which state was selected, disconfirmatory evidence is informative and can be 
used to reduce uncertainty.  However, when prior beliefs are strong and participants feel certain 
they know which state was selected, disconfirmatory evidence produces conflict and may require 
backtracking from the current belief. We refer to evidence that disconfirms strong prior beliefs as 
conflicting evidence. Greatest conflict occurs when both the prior belief is strong and the evidence 
strongly supports the alternative hypothesis, and conflict decreases as either the prior belief 
strength decreases or the evidence strength decreases.  We found right-lateralized activations for 
conflicting evidence, but left-lateralized activations for disconfirmatory evidence. This highlights the 
role of right frontal regions in processing belief-evidence conflicts.  These results support the idea 
that the left hemisphere plays a dominant role in inference making; when uncertainty is high and 
disconfirmatory evidence aids hypothesis selection, left-frontal networks dominate. Right frontal 
networks are only recruited when evidence disconfirms a strongly held belief, supporting the idea 
that right frontal networks figuratively apply a “cognitive brake” when beliefs and evidence conflict.  
3. Belief advances vs. belief backtracks 
A central tenet of our framework is that left frontal networks are biased toward reducing 
uncertainty and right frontal networks are biased toward reducing conflict. We argue that these 
biases contribute to asymmetric processing in reasoning, such that left frontal networks are 
recruited to reduce uncertainty (for example, during inference making or hypothesizing) and right 
frontal networks are recruited to reduce conflict (for example, when evidence conflicts strongly held 
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beliefs). In this fMRI experiment, we recorded participants’ brain activity and tracked when and to 
what extent their beliefs changed as they observed evidence. According to our framework, we 
should expect to find more left-lateralized activity when participants become more certain of their 
guesses and move the slider closer toward either end of the track. In contrast, we should expect to 
find more right-lateralized activity when people backtrack on their guess and move the slider closer 
toward the middle of the track. Consistent with our predictions, the advance > backtrack contrast 
was associated with greater activity in the left vs. the right homologues of each of the five frontal 
anatomical regions we examined. This provides support for our proposal that left frontal networks 
play a dominant role in reducing uncertainty by making inferences and right frontal networks play a 
dominant role in reducing conflict by backtracking on untenable hypotheses.  
Since both belief backtracks and belief advances were types of slider updates and participants 
could only update the slider by pressing buttons, we attempted to subtract out motor-related 
activity due to button presses. Even so, we found motor-related activity in the advance > button 
press contrast. This is likely due to the fact that the regressor for belief advances was continuous 
and increased with larger advances. The regressor for button-presses, on the other hand, was a 
boxcar (in order to avoid creating a singular design matrix). Since the belief advance regressor 
captured both the presence and durations of button presses while the button press regressor only 
captured the presence of button presses, it is likely that the button press regressor did not fully 
account for all motor related activity, which may explain the motor-related activity in the advance > 
button-press contrast.   
4. Uncertainty and the inferior frontal gyrus 
Surprisingly, the inferior frontal gyrus was associated with relatively greater activity in the right 
hemisphere than the left hemisphere for the uncertainty contrast. Not only is this result inconsistent 
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with our predictions, but it also complicates the interpretability of the tDCS experiments. We 
targeted the bilateral inferior frontal gyri under the assumption that the left IFG was more sensitive 
to uncertainty and the right IFG was more sensitive to conflict. Although we did find that activity 
increased in the left IFG with increasing uncertainty, it did so to a lesser extent than it did in the 
right IFG. This may explain why some behavior was occasionally more similar between the LH-bias 
and RH-bias conditions in the tDCS experiment than between each active condition and the sham 
condition.  
Based on the results of this experiment, it may be beneficial to repeat the tDCS experiments 
with a modified electrode montage. One option is to introduce more electrodes in order to 
stimulate the left and right frontal lobes more diffusely. Another option is to target the right IFG as 
before, but change the left hemisphere target to the middle frontal gyrus since it was robustly 
activated during uncertainty. These issues are discussed in more detail in the next section.  
V. Discussion 
A. Summary of the results 
Overall, we found more evidence for our predictions regarding the effects of RH-bias 
stimulation than LH-bias stimulation. In the first tDCS experiment, we found that participants who 
received more intense RH-bias stimulation at the cortex collected more evidence, adopted higher 
thresholds for stopping evidence collection, and were less certain than ideal throughout the 
beginning of the evidence presentation. In the second tDCS experiment, we found that RH-bias 
stimulation was associated with a smaller likelihood of belief advances (and corresponding greater 
likelihoods of backtracks and non-updates) during conflict in the ballot measures task. The heatmap 
analyses for the criminal court cases and ballot measures revealed that RH-bias stimulation was 
associated with greater backtracking when evidence disconfirmed certain beliefs compared to sham 
stimulation and, to a lesser extent, compared to LH-bias stimulation. Under RH-bias stimulation, 
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participants were less likely to judge real news headlines as being real, which resulted in poorer 
discrimination of real vs. fake headlines compared to sham and LH-bias stimulation. Finally, in the 
fMRI experiment, we found that right frontal regions were recruited more robustly than left frontal 
regions during conflict and during belief backtracks.  
Greater LH-bias stimulation intensity was only associated with one behavioral measure. We 
found that greater LH-bias stimulation intensity led to more evidence collection in the state 
guessing experiment, which was inconsistent with our predictions. Surprisingly, we consistently 
found that the influence of LH-bias stimulation intensity on behavior was in the same direction as 
the influence of RH-bias stimulation intensity, but was always associated with a smaller effect size. 
The results from the fMRI experiment regarding left-lateralized contrasts were generally in line with 
predictions. We found that the left frontal anatomical regions were more strongly recruited than 
right frontal regions for contrasts that we expected to be more left-lateralized, including greater 
uncertainty, advances in beliefs, and unexpected evidence. However, we found that the inferior 
frontal gyrus, which we stimulated with tDCS, was associated with greater activity for the uncertainty 
and advance > button press contrasts, which is inconsistent with expectations.  
B. Limitations, interpretations, and implications 
1.  Electric field strengths at the cortical surface 
Voroslakos and colleagues (2018) recently found that electric fields of 1 V/m or greater are 
required to modulate neuronal firing in rats. This finding challenges the widely accepted view that 
tDCS modulates spontaneous neural activity because models of current flow indicate that common 
tDCS electrode montages induce electric fields weaker than 1 V/m at the cortical surface.  
Since we modeled the current flow for every participant in both tDCS experiments, we can 
estimate the strength of the electric fields induced at the cortical surface and determine how many 
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participants had cortical electric fields greater than 1 V/m (Figure 52). In the first tDCS experiment, 
we induced electric fields greater than 1 V/m at the cortical surface for 17 out of the 26 participants 
(65.4%). In the second tDCS experiment, we only induced cortical electric fields greater than 1 V/m 
for 3 of the 24 participants (12.5%). The large disparity between the two tDCS experiments is the 
result of using 2mA stimulation in the first tDCS experiment and 1.5mA stimulation in the second. 
Stimulation intensity was purposely reduced in the second experiment as a safety precaution. Since 
the stimulation duration in the second experiment was almost twice as long as the first experiment, 
maintaining a current intensity of 2mA would nearly double the total amount of current delivered. 
Second, the current modeling results from the first tDCS experiment indicated that the cortical 
current densities induced by our electrode montage were higher than the current densities induced 
by common HD-montages and sponge montages (Bikson et al, 2016), so we felt it was prudent to 
reduce the stimulation intensity so that the cortical current density was more in line with the 
literature (Note: this decision was made prior to the publication of Voroslakos et al. (2018)).  
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Figure 52: Maximum electric field magnitudes at the cortical surface (V/m).  Top: Estimated 
electric field magnitudes for every participant in the first (purple) and second (orange) tDCS 
experiments. Bottom: Estimated electric field magnitudes for the HD-tDCS (blue) and sponge 
(gray) montages reported in Bikson et al., 2016.  
 
In their 2016 review of the safety and tolerability of tDCS, Bikson and colleagues present the 
maximum current density on the skin and brain surfaces for 7 HD montages and 12 traditional 
sponge montages. In order to compare the electric field intensities induced by these montages to 
those induced by our electrode montages, we determined the slope and intercept needed to 
linearly map current density to electric fields based on our modeling data (linear regression with a 
slope and intercept term, R2=1), estimated the cortical current densities from the scatter plot in 
Figure 3 of Bikson et al. (2016), and converted the current densities to electric fields. Figure 52 
includes the distribution of cortical electric fields for the HD-montages (blue) and sponge montages 
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(gray). Only one montage is associated with an electric field intensity at the cortical surface greater 
than 1 V/m and that montage was modeled with a pediatric head.   
The electric fields we induced in the first tDCS experiment are greater than those induced by 
common electrode montages, and the electric fields we induced in the second tDCS experiment 
are well within the range of those induced by traditional sponge montages. The reason that our 
electrode montage was associated with stronger electric fields than the other HD montages is that 
our montage consisted of electrodes on each side of the head, which served to pull current through 
the brain and maximize current intensity at the cortical targets. Most of the other HD montages 
used a 4x1 ring configuration (with an anode surrounded by four cathodes) which is intended to 
maximize current focality rather than intensity. Even though our current modeling results indicate 
that we did not induce electric fields greater than 1 V/m at the cortex for all participants (especially 
in the second tDCS experiment), the electric fields that we induced were as great or greater than 
the fields induced by electrode montages that are commonly reported in the literature. Still, the 
differences in cortical stimulation intensities between experiments 1 and 2 may explain the stronger 
effects of stimulation on behavior in the first experiment compared to the second experiment.  
2. Sources of variability in tDCS and the need for modeling 
In the last two years, several studies have been published that paint more nuanced pictures of 
the mechanisms and effects of tDCS. Although it has been known for a long time that the effects of 
tDCS depend on electrode placement, electrode size and shape, current intensity, and stimulation 
duration (Nitsche et al., 2008), more recent research has shown that the effects of tDCS depend on 
additional factors that are less controllable. Some of the sources of variability in tDCS studies, both 
controllable and uncontrollable, are listed in Table 2.   
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Kronberg, Bridi, Abel, Bikson, and Parra (2016) applied electric fields to hippocampal slices and 
found that tDCS only modulated synaptic plasticity of neurons that were already active. They also 
found that cathodal stimulation reduced long term depression (LTD) and enhanced long term 
potentiation (LTP) in apical dendrites, whereas anodal stimulation reduced LTD in apical dendrites 
but enhanced LTP in basal dendrites. The asymmetric effects of stimulation on synaptic plasticity 
complicates the simple notion that anodal stimulation is excitatory and cathodal stimulation is 
inhibitory.  Rahman et al. (2013) examined how the orientation of neurons in an electric field 
influences the effects of tDCS. They found that radial electric fields, in which the neurons run 
parallel to the field, produce the canonical effects of excitatory anodal stimulation and inhibitory 
cathodal stimulation, but transverse fields that run perpendicular to the neurons create asymmetric 
effects that depend on neuronal pathways. Lafron, Rahman, Bikson, and Parra (2016) also found 
evidence that neurons increase firing under anodal stimulation and decrease firing under cathodal 
stimulation when aligned with the electric field, but they reported asymmetric effect sizes. Anodal 
stimulation was associated with much stronger effects than cathodal stimulation. One important 
caveat of these studies is that they used electric fields that are order of magnitudes stronger than 
those induced by tDCS in humans (8-35 V/m compared to < 1 V/m), so these mechanisms may not 
explain how tDCS exerts its effects in humans.  
There’s also no clear evidence that increasing stimulation intensity corresponds to greater 
changes in neuronal activity or in behavior. In a recent study, Jamil et al. (2017) characterized the 
after-effects of anodal and cathodal tDCS at different stimulation intensities. They found that anodal 
stimulation reliably increased cortical excitability, but cathodal stimulation only inhibited cortical 
excitability at 1mA, but not at 0.5mA, 1.5mA or 2mA. Furthermore, although anodal stimulation 
consistently increased cortical excitability, there was no dose-dependent relationship between 
current intensity and changes in cortical excitability.  In a review of dosing effects in tDCS, 
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Esmailpour et al. (2017) conclude that there is no reliable evidence showing that there is a linear, or 
even a monotonic, relationship between current intensity and neuronal effects.  
In addition to stimulation parameters, neuronal orientation, and current intensity, the effects of 
tDCS can be influenced by individual differences in head size (Bikson et al., 2016; Kessler et al., 
2013), fat content (Truong et al., 2013), skull thickness (Opitz, Paulus, Antunes, & Theilscher, 2015), 
cerebrospinal fluid volume and thickness (Lassko, Tanaka, Koyama, Santis, & Hirata, 2015; Opitz et 
al., 2015), sulcal depth (Opitz et al., 2015), age (Lassko et al, 2015; Fujiyama et al., 2014; Heise et 
al., 2014), and baseline cognitive abilities (Jones & Berryhill, 2012; Hsu, Juan, & Tseng, 2016; Rosen 
et al., 2016). In their review of the factors that contribute to individual variability tDCS responses, Li, 
Uehara, and Hanakawa (2015) provide evidence that the effects of tDCS are influenced by anatomy, 
functional organization of local neuronal circuits, baseline motor and cognitive abilities, baseline 
neurochemistry, circadian rhythms, and genetics. Additionally, several studies have shown that task 
demands can interact with the effects of stimulation (Bortoletto, Pellicciari, Rodella, Miniussi, 2015; 
Cabral et al., 2015; Gill, Shah-Basak, & Hamilton, 2015; Saucedo Marquez, Zhang, Swinnen, Meesen 
& Wenderoth, 2013). 
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Table 2 : Controllable and uncontrollable sources of variability in tDCS.  
Sources of variability in tDCS 
Controllable sources of variability 
 Electrode montage and stimulation parameters 
  Electrode size and shape 
  Configuration of anode(s) and cathode(s) 
  Current intensity 
  Stimulation duration 
 Stimulation procedures 
  Electrode placement between sessions and between participants 
Uncontrollable sources of variability 
 Neuronal excitability 
  Endogenous neural activity 
  Orientation of neurons in the electric field 
  Neuron morphology and the distributions of different cell types 
  Age 
  Network effects 
  Non-linear dose responses to current intensity 
 Delivery of current 
  Volume and flow of cerebrospinal fluid 
  Tissue conductivity 
Sulcal depth 
  Blood pressure 
  Resistance at electrode sites 
  Head size 
  Fat content 
  Skull thickness 
 Networks and behavior  
  Cognitive abilities at baseline  
  Cognitive strategies 
  Expectations 
  Task demands  
  Compensation 
 
Current may also be distributed unintuitively throughout the brain. It has repeatedly been 
shown that sponge electrode montages deliver peak current densities to cortical regions in 
between the anode and cathode rather than beneath the anode as originally thought. It has also 
recently been shown that tDCS can deliver current to deep brain structures due to the high 
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conductivity of cerebrospinal fluid. Huang et al. (2017) recorded electric fields with intracranial 
electrodes embedded in the brains of epileptic patients as they were stimulated with tDCS and 
found that electric fields in deep brain areas were nearly as intense as electric fields on the cortical 
surface.  
These sources of variability muddle the simplistic view that anodal stimulation increases cortical 
activity and cathodal stimulation decreases it and point to the importance of using current modeling 
to estimate the effects of stimulation on an individual basis. We went to great lengths to control for 
some of these sources of variability. We defined neural targets for each participant based on their 
cortical folds, we modeled current flow in each participant to account for differences in head size, 
skull thickness, and fat content in the head, and we used a camera positioning system to ensure that 
the electrodes were placed precisely and consistently across sessions. Finally, we accounted for 
individual differences in maximum cortical current density in all of our regression analyses.  We are 
unaware of any tDCS or HD-tDCS study that was as well controlled as ours.  
We repeatedly found that individual differences in the intensity of the stimulation at the cortical 
surface predicted differences in behavior. This suggests that, not only is current delivered to the 
cortex differently in different people, but that these differences are important and can influence 
behavior. Our results provide strong evidence that researchers should model current flow for all 
participants and include the modeling results as factors in their analyses.  
3. Similarity between RH-bias and LH-bias stimulation conditions  
We predicted that LH-bias stimulation and RH-bias stimulation would produce opposite and 
symmetric effects, such that if LH-bias stimulation was associated with greater effects compared to 
sham, RH-bias would be associated with smaller effects (or null effects) compared to sham, and vice 
versa. However, we often found that behavior in the two active stimulation conditions were more 
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similar than either condition compared to sham. For example, in each of the continuous heatmaps, 
the LH>sham and RH>sham maps generally looked similar – certainly more similar than would be 
expected if LH-bias stimulation and RH-bias stimulation induced opposite effects compared to 
sham. Furthermore, in almost all of the regression analyses, the coefficients for stimulation intensity 
went in the same direction for both the RH-bias and LH-bias stimulation conditions, which suggests 
that the magnitude of stimulation had a greater effect than the polarity of stimulation. It is important 
to note that in all but one case, the effects of LH-bias stimulation were not significant, even before 
correcting for multiple comparisons. Even though the effects were not significant, the fact that they 
consistently went in the same direction as RH-bias stimulation warrants a discussion.  
There are several possible explanations for these results that can be summarized by three 
general explanations: 1) the physical sensations produced by active stimulation exert a stronger 
influence on behavior than any changes in neural activity, 2) our predictions about hemispheric 
asymmetry in reasoning are wrong, or 3) our assumptions about the neuromodulatory effects of 
tDCS are wrong. We discuss the merit of each of these explanations below.  
The first interpretation of the similarity between LH-bias and RH-bias conditions is that the 
physical sensations of the stimulation are driving changes in behavior. It is possible that greater 
current densities produce greater physical sensations and these sensations are salient enough 
during the task to influence behavior. To test this hypothesis, we examined the relationship 
between the estimated cortical current density for each participant and their reports of the intensity 
of the tDCS sensations. We found no relationship between participants’ sensation intensity ratings 
and their estimated cortical current densities (Figure 53), suggesting that the intensity of sensations 
associated with tDCS is not driving the differences observed between the active and sham 
conditions.   
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Figure 53: Relationship between self-reported stimulation intensities and estimated current 
densities at the cortical surface. Participants were asked to report the intensity of the stimulation 
30 seconds after stimulation (before the task started). If participants finished the task during 
stimulation, they were asked to rate the intensity of the stimulation again. Only data from the 
active tDCS sessions are included in the plots.  
 
A second interpretation is that the LH-bias and RH-bias stimulation protocols resulted in similar 
changes in behavior because human reasoning does not have a hemispheric lateralization 
component. Although patient studies provide strong evidence for different reasoning biases in each 
hemisphere, it is possible that these results do not extend to healthy individuals. That is, it is 
possible that the observed patterns of lateralization in reasoning are artifacts of abnormal brain 
functioning, and are not present in healthy brains. Although plausible, this explanation is 
inconsistent with our fMRI results, which generally consisted of asymmetric activations that were in 
line with our predictions.  
Another possibility is that our general framework of hemispheric lateralization in reasoning is 
accurate, but we stimulated inappropriate neural targets. This possibility is more in line with our 
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fMRI results. We expected that the uncertainty contrast and the advance > button press contrast 
would be associated with greater activity in the left vs. right interior frontal gyrus but we observed 
the opposite. This finding may help explain the similarity between LH-bias and RH-bias stimulation 
since we targeted the bilateral inferior frontal gyri in both tDCS experiments. If it is the case that the 
left IFG and right IFG play similar roles in reasoning, it is unclear why the effects of anodal and 
cathodal stimulation did not cancel out. That is, enhancing neural activity in one region and 
inhibiting activity in another region that does the same thing should result in a net neutral effect and 
should not depend on the intensity of stimulation. However, we consistently found that behavior 
was modulated by greater intensities of RH-bias stimulation at the cortical surface. If it is the case 
that the left and right IFG contribute to reasoning similarly and there is no hemispheric asymmetry, 
the effects of anodal and cathodal stimulation would have to be asymmetric to account for our 
results.  
The fMRI results suggest that the left middle frontal gyrus may serve as a better neural target 
than the left inferior frontal gyrus. In the future, the tDCS experiments could be replicated with a 
different electrode montage that targets the left middle frontal gyrus and right inferior frontal gyrus. 
However, we should also note that it is likely that the stimulation in our tDCS studies extended 
outside of the inferior frontal gyri into the middle and superior frontal gyri since we did not optimize 
the electrode configuration for focality. In the individual brain maps, it is apparent that the highest 
current density occurs in the inferior frontal gyrus, but current is delivered to the entire frontal lobe 
to some extent.  
A third interpretation is that the commonly held view that anodal stimulation increases cortical 
excitability and cathodal stimulation decreases excitability is inaccurate and our stimulation set up 
did not simultaneously increase activity in one hemisphere and decrease it in the other hemisphere 
as intended. As discussed previously, Jamil et al., 2017 did not find that cathodal stimulation 
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inhibited motor cortex at intensities of 1.5mA and 2mA, which we applied in our experiments. 
Jacobson, Koslowsky, and Lavidor (2012) reviewed the inhibitory and excitatory effects of tDCS and 
found that studies generally report that anodal stimulation increases excitability in motor cortex and 
cathodal stimulation decreases excitability in motor cortex, but this excitation/inhibition relationship 
does not generalize to non-motor cortical regions; when brain areas outside the motor cortex are 
stimulated, the effect sizes of behavioral measures are much larger for anodal stimulation than for 
cathodal stimulation.  Furthermore, cathodal stimulation has asymmetric effects on inducing 
synaptic plasticity (Kronberg et al., 2017) and neuronal firing (Rahman et al., 2013; Lafon et al., 
2017) compared to anodal stimulation. As evidence that unilateral and bilateral stimulation 
protocols may produce differential effects, Leite and colleagues (2018) found that anodal right IFG 
stimulation had different effects on attentional switching costs than bilateral anodal right IFG 
stimulation and cathodal left IFG stimulation.  
A combination of the second and third explanations best account for the results we observed. If 
1) the neuromodulatory effects of anodal stimulation are stronger than cathodal stimulation and 2) 
we stimulated the wrong neural target in the left hemisphere, then we would expect to see greater 
effects in the RH-bias stimulation condition than the LH-bias stimulation condition and the effects 
could go in the same direction. These are two very strong assumptions that are only weakly backed 
up by evidence. Additional experiments are necessary to determine the individual contributions of 
the left IFG and right IFG to reasoning and to determine if a modified bilateral stimulation protocol 
produces opposite changes in behavior under LH-bias stimulation vs. RH-bias stimulation.  
C. Future directions 
In both tDCS experiments, we attempted to bias activity toward one hemisphere by applying 
bilateral stimulation to the inferior frontal gyri. Based on a body of literature showing that anodal 
stimulation increases cortical excitability and cathodal stimulation decrease cortical excitability 
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(reviewed in Nitsche et al., 2008 and Stagg & Nitsche, 2011), we simultaneously applied anodal and 
cathodal stimulation to the inferior frontal gyri to induce hemispheric asymmetry in healthy 
individuals. Recent evidence suggests that cathodal and anodal stimulation may not produce 
opposite and equal effects, especially in non-motor brain areas, suggesting that our stimulation 
protocols may not have induced hemispheric asymmetry as intended.  It would be informative to 
repeat both tDCS experiments with a modified stimulation protocol that stimulates each 
hemisphere in isolation in the future. A within-subjects design with three sessions consisting of 
anodal left frontal stimulation, anodal right frontal stimulation, and sham stimulation could shed 
light on the individual contributions of each frontal lobe on reasoning while obviating the need to 
interpret the asymmetric effects of cathodal and anodal stimulation. A modified version of the 4x1 
ring system (Datta et al., 2009) could be adopted to deliver anodal or cathodal stimulation to one 
frontal lobe without influencing the contralateral hemisphere. One disadvantage of the 4x1 ring 
electrode configuration is that it delivers much less current to brain targets than the bilateral 2-
electrode configuration that we used. Before adopting the unilateral stimulation protocol, it would 
be imperative to ensure that the montages can induce 1 V/m electric fields in target areas with 
modeling. Another option would be to use a bilateral stimulation but make the cortical densities 
under the cathode orders of magnitude weaker than those under the anode by increasing the size 
of the cathode or the distance between multiple cathodes.  
We controlled for differences in current density in each participant’s brain by modeling current 
flow in each participant and including estimates of cortical current densities in our regression 
analyses. In the future, differences in current delivery can be controlled more directly by applying 
stimulation at different intensities for different participants. The electric fields induced at target 
brain sites for a given stimulation intensity could be estimated for every participant, and then the 
current intensities needed to induce the same electric field strength across participants could be 
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computed for each participant. Although this would not obviate individual differences in cortical 
excitability, endogenous neural activity, or network configurations, it could reduce the variability 
that arises from differences in current delivery. One caveat of this approach is that some participants 
will likely require stimulation intensities greater than 2mA, which may introduce safety concerns and 
exceed the limits of tDCS stimulators (for example, the stimulator we used can deliver a maximum 
of 2.5mA). As an additional level of control, the neuromodulatory effects of tDCS could be verified 
after stimulation with fMRI or EEG and directly accounted for in the behavioral analyses.   
Finally, it would be interesting to run an additional fMRI experiment in the future with the same 
structure as the state guessing task, but using the ballot measures and criminal court cases used in 
the second tDCS experiment. This would serve to replicate our neuroimaging results and identify 
brain areas that are recruited when reasoning about scenarios with greater real-world 
consequences.  
D. Hemispheric asymmetry in reasoning 
Lateralized processing in the brain is both prevalent and beneficial: it maximizes the use of 
cortical space by reducing redundancy (Corballis, 1989; Gazzaniga, 2000; Vallortigara, 2006; 
Hopkins and Cantalupo, 2008), enhances brain efficiency by supporting dual processing (Rogers, 
2000; Rogers et al., 2004; Vallortigara, 2006), reduces interhemispheric conflict by allowing the 
hemispheres to operate in separate problem spaces (Corballis, 2003; Vallortigara, 2006), and 
increases processing speed (Ringo et al., 1994). Hemispheric lateralization of inferential reasoning 
may be especially beneficial. Dual reasoning strategies—one driven to reduce uncertainty and the 
other driven to resolve inconsistency—create a flexible, efficient, and balanced reasoning system. 
Cognitive modules in the left hemisphere, with their propensities to create explanations, bridge 
gaps, and infer causation, may be preferentially recruited in situations that require creativity and 
liberal inference making. Conversely, cognitive modules in the right hemisphere, with their 
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tendencies to detect conflict, monitor explanations in a global context, and inhibit inappropriate 
inferences, may play a greater role in situations that necessitate caution and conservative reasoning. 
Simply biasing these reasoning systems in accordance with situational demands ensures reasoning 
is adaptive, sensible, and efficient. In a healthy brain, the different inferential capabilities of the 
hemispheres enhance reasoning by maximizing both explanatory power and plausibility.  
One consistent finding across all three experiments is that there is likely a hemispheric 
lateralization component to processing belief-evidence conflicts, but not all types of disconfirmatory 
evidence. Our results suggest that the right hemisphere does not continually evaluate or monitor all 
incoming evidence. Instead, it seems to only be recruited when strong evidence disconfirms 
strongly held beliefs. This is consistent with the results from our meta-analyses in which we found 
that simplistic evaluative labels (“rule finding” and “statement verification”) were not right-
lateralized, but the conflict label was completely right-lateralized. Is it also consistent with the 
differences in belief updating in response to conflict that we observed between tDCS experiments 1 
and 2. In the first tDCS experiment, we found that LH-bias stimulation was associated with greater 
belief updates after conflict, but we found that RH-bias was stimulation was associated with greater 
updates after conflict in the second experiment. The tasks used in tDCS experiments 1 and 2 both 
involved receiving evidence that disconfirmed certain beliefs, but the belief-evidence conflicts in 
the second tDCS experiment were much stronger due to the types of stimuli used. Differences in 
belief-evidence conflict intensity can also explain why we found an interaction between RH-bias 
stimulation and conflict for the ballot measures, some of which were associated with very strong 
prior beliefs, but not the court cases, which were usually associated with neutral prior beliefs. 
Finally, in the fMRI experiment, we found right-lateralized networks for our conflict contrasts, but 
left-lateralized networks for the disconfirmatory evidence contrast. Together, these results suggest 
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that the right hemisphere plays a pivotal role in processing salient conflicts between strong 
evidence and strong beliefs, but does not play a specialized role in simplistic evaluative processing.  
In summary, we found that anodal tDCS to the right IFG and cathodal tDCS to the left IFG 
changed participants’ reasoning compared to sham stimulation. Participants collected more 
evidence, adopted higher evidentiary thresholds for making a final inference, made less certain 
guesses than ideal, and were less likely to adopt more extreme beliefs in response to belief-
evidence conflict. Surprisingly, we did not find equal and opposite results for anodal left IFG 
stimulation and cathodal right IFG stimulation. It is unclear whether the effects of the RH-bias 
stimulation were driven by cathodal stimulation to the left IFG, anodal stimulation to the right IFG, 
or a combination of both. All three views are consistent with our predictions concerning 
hemispheric asymmetry in reasoning. Future unilateral tDCS studies are necessary to disentangle 
the individual contributions of anodal and cathodal stimulation on each hemisphere. However, we 
did find at least some evidence that inducing hemispheric asymmetry with tDCS changes 
participants’ reasoning biases, suggesting that there is some component of hemispheric asymmetry 
in reasoning.   
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Appendix 
Table A: Subjective reports of the effects of stimulation in the first tDCS experiment. 
ID LH-bias SHAM RH-bias 
101 felt slightly dazed, high-like no changes harder to concentrate 
102 felt more sure of decision no changes no changes 
103 no changes, zoned out 
occasionally 
no changes no changes 
104 hard to maintain focus, 
information seemed muddled 
mentally hazy for a little bit --- 
105 ---  --- --- 
106 --- --- --- 
107 --- task seemed harder, harder to 
decide 
--- 
108 harder to concentrate, harder to 
remember previous residents 
--- --- 
109 no changes no changes hard to concentrate, harder to 
remember residents 
110 --- lost focus a little, forgot 
decision during forced choice 
felt like residents were passing 
by faster 
111 --- no changes no changes 
112 less patient with the residents, 
would decide quickly, “good 
enough” 
“caffeine buzz”, slightly light-
headed, cognition same 
--- 
113 ---  did it faster, especially at the 
end 
--- 
114 slightly more distracted felt tired no changes 
115 easily distracted concentrating was more difficult no changes 
116 before would not move slider all 
the way, but this time moved it all 
the way toward ends, “go big or 
go home” 
felt like could focus less seemed easier, more clear 
117 felt more unsure, especially for 
CA & NM 
no changes no changes 
118 no changes no changes no changes 
119 no changes felt more impatient, sometimes 
forget 
more decisive after seeing 4 
people 
120 no changes felt like it went faster no changes 
121 felt a little more unable to 
concentrate 
felt more concentrated felt more closely related 
122 no changes felt like it was going faster felt more tired 
123 even more careful than last time focus would vary, was more 
careful 
felt like residents were going 
by quicker than last time 
124 --- harder to focus got really tired, harder to focus 
125 no changes no changes felt easier, quicker. harder to 
remember previous residents 
126 distracted in beginning because 
of tingling 
getting sleepy no changes 
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